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I. INTRODUCTION
This article first discusses some of the basic principles involved in the
drafting of acquisition agreements. The focus is on asset acquisitions,
including the Model Asset Purchase Agreement, which was recently
published by the American Bar Association ("ABA").' The article then
presents the transcript of a Mock Negotiation of an Asset Acquisition, which was
presented at the University of Miami School of Law's Fifth Annual Institute on
Mergers & Acquisitions: Corporate, Securities & Related Aspects. The authors
participated in that negotiation.
Section II introduces the three principal structures for effectuating a sale
of a business; Section III addresses the issue of whether an acquisition should
be structured as an asset acquisition; and Section IV discusses a key issue in
any asset acquisition: the potential that the buyer may have successor liability
for liabilities of the seller that are not explicitly assumed. Section V addresses
ethical issues that can arise in asset acquisitions, and Section VI discusses the
organization of the Model Asset Purchase Agreement. Section VII presents
the transcript of the Mock Negotiation of an Asset Acquisition, and the
Appendices contain the sections (without the commentary) of the draft of
Model Asset Purchase Agreement that are discussed in the Mock
Negotiation.
American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, Model Asset Purchase Agreement With
Commentary (2001)[hereinafter the "Model Asset Purchase Agreement"]. As a basis for the bulk of the
materials included herein, the authors have utilized portions of a draft of the Model Asset Purchase
Agreement and certain other materials prepared for programs of the Negotiated Acquisitions Committee.
The authors express appreciation to the many members of the Asset Acquisition Task Force whose
contributions have made these materials possible. These materials, however, are solely the responsibility
of the authors and have not been reviewed or approved by either the Negotiated Acquisitions Committee
or its Asset Acquisition Agreement task force.
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All of the issues discussed in this article are explored in greater detail in
the Model Asset Purchase Agreement, which every business lawyer should
have in his or her library.
II ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES FOR SALES OF BUSINESSES
The actual form of the sale of a business can involve many variations.
Nonetheless, there are many common threads involved for the draftsman.
The principal segments of a typical agreement for the sale of a business
include:
* Introductory material (i.e., opening paragraph and recitals);
" The price and mechanics of the business combination;
" Representations and warranties of the buyer and seller;
• Covenants of the buyer and seller;
* Conditions to closing;
* Indemnification;
" Termination procedures and remedies; and
" Miscellaneous (boilerplate) clauses.
There are many basic legal and business considerations for the draftsman
involved in the preparation of agreements for the sale of a business. These
include federal income taxes; state sales, use and transfer taxes; federal and
state environmental laws; federal and state securities laws; the accounting
treatment; state takeover laws; problems involving minority shareholders; the
purchaser's liability for the seller's debts and contingent liabilities; insolvency
and creditors' rights laws; problems in transferring assets (mechanical and
otherwise); state corporation laws; stock exchange rules; pension, profit-
sharing and other employee benefit plans; antitrust laws; foreign laws;
employment, consulting and non-compete agreements; union contacts and
other labor considerations; the purchaser's security for breach of
representations and warranties; insurance; and a myriad of other
considerations.
There are three basic forms of business acquisitions:
1. Statutory business combinations (e.g., mergers, consolidations
and share exchanges);
2. Purchases of shares; and
3. Purchases of assets.
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A. Mergers and Consolidations
Mergers and consolidations involve a vote of shareholders, resulting in
the merging or disappearance of one corporate entity into or with another
corporate entity. Mergers and consolidations can be structured to be taxable
or non-taxable for federal income tax purposes. Simply stated, if stock is the
consideration for the acquisition of the non-surviving corporation, the
merger can qualify as anA reorganization under Section 368(a)(1)(A) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code").2 Thus, a
shareholder of the target corporation receives stock in the purchasing
corporation wholly tax-free. However, a shareholder of the target company
who receives only boot (i.e., consideration other than purchaser's stock or
other purchaser securities under certain circumstances) is normally taxed as
if the shareholder had sold his stock in the target corporation in a taxable
transaction. Generally stated, a shareholder who receives both stock and boot
is not taxed on the stock received but is taxed on the boot. The boot is taxed
either as a dividend or as a capital gain, but not in excess of the gain which
would have been realized if the transaction were fully taxable.
B. Purchases of Shares
Purchases of shares of the target company can likewise be handled on a
taxable or non-taxable basis. In a voluntary stock purchase, the acquiring
corporation must generally negotiate with each selling shareholder
individually. An exception to this is a mechanism known as the share
exchange permitted by certain state business corporation statutes3 under
which the vote of holders of the requisite percentage (but less than all) of
shares can bind all of the shareholders to exchange their shares pursuant to
the plan of exchange approved by such vote.
Generally speaking, if the purchasing corporation acquires the stock of
the target corporation solely in exchange for the purchaser's voting stock and,
after the transaction the purchasing corporation owns stock in the target
corporation possessing at least 80% of the target's voting power and at least
80% of each class of the target corporation's non-voting stock, the transaction
can qualify as a tax-free B reorganization.
Note that one disadvantage of an acquisition of the target corporation's
stock is that the purchasing corporation does not obtain a step-up in the basis
2 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2001).
3 See, e.g., Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. Ann. Art. 5.02 and 5.06 (Vernon 2000).
4 See I.R.C. S 368(a)(1)(B) (2001).
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of the target corporation's assets for tax purposes. If the stock acquisition
qualifies as a qualified stock purchase under Section 338 of the Code (which
generally requires a taxable acquisition by a corporation of at least 80% ofthe
target corporation's stock within a 12-month period), an election may be
made to treat the stock acquisition as a taxable asset purchase for tax
purposes. However, after the effective repeal of the General Utilities5 doctrine,
discussed infra, Section 338 elections are seldom made unless the target is a
member of a group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax
return (or, since 1994, an S corporation) and the seller(s) agrees to a Section
338(h)(10) election which causes the seller to bear the tax on the deemed
asset sale, since the present value of the tax savings to the buyer from a
stepped-up basis in target's assets is less than the corporate-level tax on the
deemed asset sale.
C. Asset Purchases
Generally speaking, asset purchases feature the advantage of specifying
the assets to be acquired and the liabilities to be assumed. A disadvantage
involved in asset purchases in recent years, however, has been the repeal,'
pursuant to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, of the so-called General Utilities
doctrine. Prior to then, the Code generally exempted a C corporation from
corporate-level taxation (other than recapture) on the sale of its assets to a
third party in connection with a complete liquidation of the corporation and
the distribution of the proceeds to its shareholders. After the effective repeal
of the General Utilities doctrine, a C corporation generally recognizes full gain
on a sale of assets even in connection with a complete liquidation. Thus, if
a purchasing corporation buys the target's assets and the target corporation
liquidates, the target pays a corporate-level tax on its full gain from the sale
of its assets (not merely the recaptured items). The shareholders of the target
are taxed as if they had sold their stock for the liquidation proceeds (less the
target's corporate tax liability). Absent available net operating losses, if the
sale is a gain, the General Utilities doctrine repeal thus makes an asset sale less
advantageous for the shareholders.
Generally speaking, for a non-taxable acquisition of assets, the purchaser
must acquire substantially all of the target's assets solely in exchange for the
voting stock of the purchaser. 6  Basically, a C reorganization is disqualified
unless the target distributes the purchaser's stock, securities and other
s Gen. Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
6 See I.R.C. S 368(a)(1)(C) (2001).
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properties it receives, as well as its other properties, in pursuance of the plan
of reorganization.
There are a number of other tax requirements applicable to tax-free and
taxable reorganizations, too numerous to cover in this article.
E[1. WHETHER TO DO ASSET PURCHASE
An acquisition might be structured as an asset purchase for a variety of
reasons. It may be the only structure that can be used when a noncorporate
seller is involved or where the buyer is only interested in purchasing a
portion of the company's assets or assuming only certain of its liabilities. If
the stock of a company is widely held or it is likely that one or more of the
shareholders will not consent, a sale of stock (except perhaps by way of a
statutory merger or share exchange) may be impractical. In many cases,
however, an acquisition can be structured as a merger, a purchase of stock or
a purchase of assets.
As a general rule, often it will be in the buyer's best interest to purchase
assets but in the seller's best interest to sell stock or merge. Because of these
competing interests, it is important that counsel for both parties be involved
at the outset in weighing the various legal and business considerations in an
effort to arrive at the optimum, or at least an acceptable, structure. Some of
the considerations are specific to the business in which a company engages,
some relate to the particular corporate or other structure of the buyer and the
seller, and others are more general in nature.
Set forth below are some of the more typical matters to be addressed in
evaluating an asset purchase as an alternative to a stock purchase or a merger
or a share exchange ("statutory combination").
A. Purchased Assets
Asset transactions are typically more complicated and more time
consuming than stock purchases and statutory combinations. In contrast to
a stock purchase, the buyer in an asset transaction will acquire only the assets
described in the acquisition agreement. Accordingly, the assets to be
purchased are often described with specificity in the agreement and the
transfer documents. The usual practice, however, is for buyer's counsel to
use a broad description that includes all of the seller's assets, while describing
the more important categories, and then to specifically describe the assets to
be excluded and retained by the seller. Often excluded are cash, accounts
receivable, litigation claims or claims for tax refunds, personal assets and
certain records pertaining only to the seller's organization. This puts the
burden on the seller to specifically identify the assets that are to be retained.
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A purchase of assets also is cumbersome because transfer of the seller's
assets to the buyer must be documented, and separate filings or recordings
may be necessary to effect the transfer. This often will involve separate real
property deeds, lease assignments, patent and trademark assignments, motor
vehicle registrations and other evidences of transfer that cannot simply be
covered by a general bill of sale or assignment. Moreover, these transfers
may involve assets in a number ofjurisdictions, all with different forms and
other requirements for filing and recording.
B. Contractual Rights
Among the assets to be transferred will be the seller's rights under
contracts pertaining to its business. Often these contractual rights cannot be
assigned without the consent of other parties. The most common examples
are leases that require consent of the lessor and joint ventures or strategic
alliances that require consent of the joint venturer or partner. This can be an
opportunity for the third party to request confidential information regarding
the financial or operational capability of the buyer and to extract concessions
in return for granting its consent. While sometimes this can be avoided by
a purchase of stock or statutory combination, many leases and other
agreements require consent to any change in ownership or control. Many
government contracts cannot be assigned and require a novation with the
buyer after the transaction is consummated. This can pose a significant risk
to a buyer.
Asset purchases also present difficult questions about ongoing coverage
for risks insured against by the seller. Most insurance policies are, by their
terms, not assignable and a buyer may not be able to secure coverage for acts
involving the seller or products it manufactures or services it renders prior
to the closing.
C. Governmental Authorizations
Transfer of licenses, permits or other authorizations granted to a seller
by governmental or quasi-governmental entities may be required. In some
cases, an application for a transfer or, if the authorization is not transferable,
for a new authorization, may involve hearings or other administrative delays
in addition to the risk of losing the authorization. Many businesses may have
been grandfathered under regulatory schemes, and are thereby exempted
from any need to make costly improvements to their properties; the buyer
may lose the grandfather benefits and be subject to additional compliance
costs.
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D. Assumed Liabilities
An important reason for structuring an acquisition as an asset transaction
is the desire on the part of a buyer to limit its responsibility for liabilities of
the seller, particularly unknown or contingent liabilities.
Unlike a stock purchase or statutory combination, where the acquired
corporation retains all of its liabilities and obligations, known and unknown,
the buyer in an asset purchase has an opportunity to determine which
liabilities of the seller it will contractually assume. Accordingly, one of the
most important issues to be resolved is what liabilities incurred by the seller
prior to the closing are to be assumed by the buyer. It is rare in an asset
purchase for the buyer not to assume some of the seller's liabilities relating
to the business, as for example the seller's obligations under contracts for the
performance of services or the manufacture and delivery of goods after the
closing. Most of the seller's liabilities will be set forth in the representations
and warranties of the seller in the acquisition agreement and in the seller's
disclosure letter or schedules, reflected in the seller's financial statements or
otherwise disclosed by the seller in the course of the negotiations and due
diligence. For these known liabilities, the issue as to which will be assumed
by the buyer and which will stay with the seller is reflected in the express
terms of the acquisition agreement.
For unknown liabilities or liabilities that are imposed on the buyer as a
matter of law, the solution is not so easy and lawyers spend significant time
and effort dealing with the allocation of responsibility and risk in respect of
such liabilities. Many acquisition agreements provide that none of the
liabilities of the seller, other than those specifically identified, are being
assumed by the buyer and then give examples of the types of liabilities not
being assumed (e.g. tax, products and environmental liabilities). There are,
however, some recognized exceptions to a buyer's ability to avoid the seller's
liabilities by the terms of the acquisition agreement, including the following-
" Bulk sales laws permit creditors of a seller to follow the assets of
certain types of sellers into the hands of a buyer unless specified
procedures are followed.
* Under fraudulent conveyance or transfer statutes, the assets
acquired by the buyer can be reached by creditors of the seller under
certain circumstances. Actual fraud is not required and a statute
may apply merely where the purchase price is not deemed fair
consideration for the transfer of assets and the seller is, or is
rendered, insolvent.
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* Liabilities can be assumed by implication, which may be the result
of imprecise drafting or third-party beneficiary arguments that can
leave a buyer with responsibility for liabilities of the seller.
* Some state tax statutes provide that taxing authorities can follow the
assets to recover taxes owed by the seller; often the buyer can secure
a waiver from the state or other accommodation to eliminate this
risk
* Under some environmental statutes and court decisions, the buyer
may become subject to remediation obligations with respect to
activities of a prior owner of real property.
* In some states, courts have held buyers of manufacturing businesses
responsible for tort liabilities for defects in products manufactured
by a seller while it controlled the business. Similarly, some courts
hold that certain environmental liabilities pass to the buyer that
acquires substantially all the seller's assets, carries on the business
and benefits from the continuation.
" The purchaser of a business may have successor liability for the
seller's unfair labor practices, employment discrimination, pension
obligations or other liabilities to employees.
* In certainjurisdictions, the purchase of an entire business where the
shareholders of the seller become shareholders of the buyer can
cause a sale of assets to be treated as a defacto merger. This theory
would result in the buyer assuming all of the seller's liabilities.
None of these exceptions prevents a buyer from attempting to limit the
liabilities to be assumed. Thus, either by compliance with a statutory scheme
(e.g., the bulk sales laws or state tax lien waiver procedure) or by careful
drafting, a conscientious buyer can take some comfort in the fact that most
contractual provisions of the acquisition agreement should be respected by
the courts and should protect the buyer against unforeseen liabilities of the
seller. However, courts have adopted a number of theories of successor
liability which can override the express terms of the contract. See Section IV
below.
It is important to recognize that in a sale of assets the seller retains
primary responsibility for satisfying all its liabilities, whether or not assumed
by the buyer. Unlike a sale of stock or a statutory combination, where the
shareholders may only be liable to the buyer through the indemnification
provisions of the acquisition agreement, a creditor still can proceed directly
against the seller after an asset sale. Ifthe seller is liquidated, its shareholders
may remain subject to claims of the seller's creditors under statutory or
common law principles, although this might be limited to the proceeds
received on liquidation and expire after a period of time. Under some state
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corporate law statutes, a seller's directors may become personally liable to its
creditors if the seller distributes the proceeds of a sale of assets to its
shareholders without making adequate provision for its liabilities.
In determining what liabilities and business risks are to be assumed by
the buyer, the lawyers drafting and negotiating the acquisition agreement
need to be sensitive to the reasons why the transaction is being structured as
a sale of assets. If the parties view the transaction as the acquisition by the
buyer of the entire business of the seller, as in a stock purchase, and the
transaction is structured as a sale of assets only for tax or other technical
reasons, then it may be appropriate for the buyer to assume most or all
liabilities, known and unknown. If instead the transaction is structured as a
sale of assets because the seller has liabilities the buyer does not want to
assume, then the liabilities to be assumed by the buyer will be
correspondingly limited.
A buyer may be concerned about successor liability exposure and not feel
secure in relying on the indemnification obligations of the seller and its
shareholders to make it whole. Under these circumstances, it might also
require that the seller maintain in effect its insurance coverage or seek
extended coverage for preclosing occurrences which could support these
indemnity obligations for the benefit of the buyer.
E. Income Taxes
In most acquisitions, the income tax consequences to the buyer and to
the seller and its shareholders are among the most important factors in
determining the structure of the transaction. The shareholders will prefer
a structure that will generate the highest after-tax proceeds to them, while the
buyer will want to seek ways to minimize taxes after the acquisition. The
ability to reconcile these goals will depend largely on whether the seller is a
C or an S corporation or is an entity taxed as a partnership.
In a taxable asset purchase, the buyer's tax basis in the purchased assets
will be equal to the purchase price (including assumed liabilities). An
important advantage to the buyer of an asset purchase is the ability to allocate
the purchase price among the purchased assets on an asset-by-asset basis to
reflect their fair market value, often increasing the tax basis from that of the
seller. This step-up in basis can allow the buyer greater depreciation and
amortization deductions in the future and less gain (or greater loss) on
subsequent disposition of those assets. (In the case of an S corporation, the
same result may be achieved by a buyer purchasing stock and making ajoint
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election with the selling shareholders under Section 338 of the Code to treat
the purchase of stock as a purchase of assets).7
A significant disadvantage of an asset sale to a C corporation and its
shareholders results from the repeal, as ofJanuary 1, 1987, of the so-called
General Utilities doctrine. This doctrine had exempted a C corporation from
corporate-level taxation (other than recapture) on the sale of its assets to a
third party at a gain followed by a complete liquidation and the distribution
of the proceeds to its shareholders. With the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine, a C corporation will generally recognize gain on a sale of assets to
a third party or on the in-kind distribution of its appreciated assets in a
complete liquidation. Thus, if a buyer purchases assets and the seller
liquidates, the seller will recognize gain or loss on an asset-by-asset basis,
which will be treated as ordinary income or loss or capital gain or loss,
depending on the character of each asset. However, corporations do not
receive the benefit of a lower rate on long-term capital gains, and the gains
can be taxed at a rate as high as 35%. Its shareholders then will be taxed as if
they had sold their stock for the proceeds received in liquidation (after
reduction by the seller's corporate tax liability). Gain or loss to the
shareholders is measured by the difference between the fair market value of
the cash or other assets received and the tax basis of the shareholders' stock.
Absent available net operating losses, the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine can make an asset transaction significantly less advantageous for the
shareholders of a C corporation. A sale of stock would avoid this double tax.
However, a buyer purchasing stock of a C corporation will obtain a stepped
up basis only in the stock, which is not an asset it would be able to amortize
or depreciate for tax purposes, and the buyer generally would not want to
succeed to the seller's presumably low tax basis in the acquired assets.
The tax treatment to the seller and its shareholders in an S corporation's
sale of assets will depend upon the form of consideration, the relationship of
the tax basis in the seller's assets (the inside basis) to the tax basis of its
shareholders in their stock (the outside basis), whether there is built-in gain
(i.e., fair market value of assets in excess of tax basis at the effective date of the
S corporation election), and whether the seller's S status will terminate.
Generally, the amount and character of the gain or loss at the corporate level
will pass through to the shareholders and be taken into account on their
individual tax returns, thereby avoiding a double tax. However, the purchase
price will be allocated among the S corporation's assets and, depending on
the relationship of the inside basis and the outside basis, the amount of the
gain or loss passed through to the shareholders for tax purposes may be more
7 See I.R.C. S 338(h)(10) (2001).
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or less than if the same price had been paid for the stock of the S corporation.
An S corporation that was formerly a C corporation also must recognize
built-in gain at the corporate level, generally for tax years beginning after
1986, on assets that it held at the time of its election of S status, unless ten
years have elapsed since the effective date of the election.
The preceding discussion relates to federal income taxes under the Code.
Special consideration must be given to state and local tax consequences of the
proposed transaction.
F. Transfer Taxes
Many state and local jurisdictions impose sales, documentary or similar
transfer taxes on the sale of certain categories of assets. For example, a sales
tax might apply to the sale of tangible personal property, other than inventory
held for resale, or a documentary tax might be required for recording a deed
for the transfer of real property. In most cases, these taxes can be avoided if
the transaction is structured as a sale of stock or a statutory combination.
Responsibility for payment of these taxes is negotiable, but it should be noted
that the seller will remain primarily liable for the tax and that the buyer may
have successor liability for them. It therefore will be in each party's interest
that these taxes are paid on a timely basis.
State or local taxes on real and personal property should also be
examined, because there may be a reassessment of the value for tax purposes
on transfer. However, this can also occur in a change in control resulting
from a sale of stock or a merger.
G. Employment Issues
A sale of assets may yield more employment or labor issues than a stock
sale or statutory combination, because the seller will typically terminate its
employees who may then be employed by the buyer. Both the seller and
buyer run the risk that employee dislocations from the transition will result
in litigation or, at the least, ill will of those employees affected. The financial
liability and risks associated with employee benefit plans, including funding,
withdrawal, excise taxes and penalties, may differ depending on the structure
of the transaction. Responsibility under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act' ("WARN Act") can vary between the parties,
depending upon whether the transaction is structured as an asset purchase,
stock purchase or statutory combination. In a stock purchase or statutory
a See 29 U.S.C. S 2101(a)-2101(b) (1988).
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combination, any collective bargaining agreements generally remain in effect.
In an asset purchase, the status of collective bargaining agreements will
depend upon whether the buyer is a successor, based on the continuity of the
business and work force or provisions of the seller's collective bargaining
agreement. If it is a successor, the buyer must recognize and bargain with the
union.
IV. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. Background
In any acquisition, regardless of form, one of the most important issues
to be resolved is what liabilities incurred by the seller prior to the closing are
to be assumed by the buyer. Most of such liabilities will be known - set forth
in the acquisition agreement and in the exhibits thereto, or otherwise
disclosed by seller to buyer in the course of the negotiations and due
diligence in the acquisition. For unknown liabilities, the legal presumption
as to who bears the risk differs markedly depending upon which of the three
conventional acquisition structures has been chosen by the parties.
" In a stock acquisition transaction, since the acquired corporation
simply has new owners of its stock and has not changed in form,
such corporation retains all of its liabilities and obligations, known
or unknown, to the same extent as it would have been responsible
for such liabilities prior to the acquisition. In brief, the acquisition
has had no effect whatsoever on the liabilities of the acquired
corporation.
* In a merger transaction, where the acquired corporation is merged
out of existence, all of its liabilities are assumed, as a matter of state
merger law, by the corporation which survives the merger. Unlike
the stock acquisition transaction, a new entity will be responsible for
the liabilities. However, the practical result is the same as in a stock
transaction; i.e. the buyer will have assumed all of the preclosing
liabilities of the acquired corporation as a matter of law.
" By contrast, in an asset purchase, the contract between the parties is
expected to determine which of the assets will be acquired by the
buyer and which of the liabilities will be assumed by the buyer.
Thus, the legal presumption is very different from the stock and
merger transactions: the buyer will not assume liabilities of the
selling corporation which the buyer has not expressly agreed to
assume by contract.
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There are a number of business reasons for structuring an acquisition as
an asset transaction rather than as a merger or purchase of stock. Some are
driven by the obvious necessities of the deal; e.g., if less than all of the assets
of the business are being acquired, such as when one acquires a division of
a large corporation. However, there is probably no more important reason
for structuring an acquisition as an asset transaction than the desire on the
part of the buyer to limit by express provisions of a contract the liabilities -
particularly unknown or contingent liabilities - which the buyer does not
intend to assume.
There have been some recognized exceptions to the buyer's ability to
avoid seller's liabilities by the terms of a contract between the seller and the
buyer:
* Bulk sales laws have permitted creditors of the seller to follow the
assets into the hands of the buyer if the bulk sales law procedures are
not complied with.
" Fraud - if the deal is really a sham and not a bonaftde arm-length
transaction, or if seller is insolvent and inadequate consideration is
paid by the buyer, under the fraudulent transfer statutes.
* Implied Assumption - really a matter of sloppy drafting coupled
with some third-party beneficiary arguments which leave the buyer
with an unexpected problem.
* Tax liens - some state tax statutes provide that taxing authorities can
follow the assets to recover taxes owed by the selling company;
generally a waiver from the state or other accommodation can
resolve.
None of these exceptions prevents a buyer from limiting the liabilities to
be assumed from a selling company. By compliance with a statutory scheme
(e.g., the bulk sales laws, state tax lien waiver procedure, etc.) or by careful
drafting (implied assumptions, representations and structures that negate the
elements of a fraudulent transfer), a buyer could structure an asset purchase
transaction to protect the buyer against liabilities of the seller that the buyer
does not intend to assume under the terms of the asset purchase agreement.
B. Successor Liability Doctrines
During the past two decades, the buyer's level of comfort in asset
purchase transactions has dropped somewhat. During that period, courts
have developed some theories which require buyers to be responsible for
seller preclosing liabilities even in the face of express contractual language in
the asset purchase agreement to the contrary. In addition, since the early
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1980's federal and state statutes have imposed strict liability for certain
environmental problems on parties not necessarily responsible for causing
those problems. These developments, particularly in the areas of product
liability, labor and employment obligations and environmental liability have
created problems for parties in asset purchase transactions. The remainder
of this section will briefly describe the principal theories of successor liability
and will address some of the techniques which lawyers have used to deal
with those problems.
1. DE FACTO MERGER
Initially, the defacto merger theory was based upon the notion that, while
a transaction had been structured as an asset purchase, the result looked very
much like a merger. The critical elements of a defacto merger were that the
selling corporation had dissolved right away and that the shareholders of the
selling corporation had received stock in the buying corporation. These two
facts made the result look very much like a merger. The theory was applied,
for example, to hold that dissenters' rights granted by state merger statutes
could not be avoided by structuring the transaction as an asset sale. While
this may have pushed an envelope or two, the analysis was nonetheless
framed within traditional common law concepts of contract and corporate
law. However, the de facto merger doctrine was expanded in 1974 to
eliminate the requirement that the corporation dissolve and, more
importantly, to introduce into the equation the public policy consideration
that if successor liability were not imposed, a products liability plaintiff
would be left without a remedy. In balancing the successor company's
interest against such a poor plaintiff, the plaintiff wins.9
The elements of a defacto merger were set forth about ten years after the
Knapp case in Hercules:10
(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation,
so that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical
location, assets and general business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders which results when the
purchasing corporation pays for the acquired assets with shares of its
own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so that they become a
constituent part of the purchasing corporation.
9 Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cit. 1974).
10 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cit. 1985).
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(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations,
liquidates and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
(4)The purchasing corporation assumes those obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of
normal business operation of the seller corporation.
In 1995 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania applied the doctrine of defacto merger to find successor liability
for environmental costs." The Court indicated that all four elements of de
facto merger set forth in Hercules did not have to be present (although in this
case all four factors were found). In addition the Court determined that
Pennsylvania law does not require that the seller's former shareholders take
control over the buyer in order to satisfy the continuity of a shareholder
factor above-mentioned. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court in
this case and held that the defacto merger doctrine would not apply in the
circumstances of this case. The facts of SmithKline Beecham were somewhat
unusual. Beecham had bought assets of a company from Rohm and Haas in
1978. Rohm and Haas had given an indemnification to Beecham for all
liabilities prior to the closing and Beecham indemnified Rohm and Haas for
liabilities following the 1978 transaction. Rohm and Haas in turn had
bought the company in 1964 - also in an asset transaction. The District
Court had held that the 1964 transaction satisfied the defacto merger rule
which meant that Rohm and Haas would be liable for the prior owner's
unknown liabilities and therefore those pre-1964 liabilities would be swept
up in the indemnification which Rohm and Haas had given to Beecham
fourteen years later. On appeal the Third Circuit determined that in the
1978 indemnification provision, Rohm and Haas did not intend to include
liabilities prior to its ownership in its indemnification of Beecham.12 Thus
the Third Circuit made the following determinations:
In this case, the parties drafted an indemnification provision that
excluded successor liability. SKB and R & H chose to define
'Business' and limit its meaning to New Whitmoyer. Under these
circumstances, we believe it was not appropriate for the district court
to apply the de facto merger doctrine to alter the effect of the
indemnification provision.
I SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 1995 WIL 117671 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17,1995).
12 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154 (3rd Cir. 1996).
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But where two sophisticated corporations drafted an indemnification
provision that excluded the liabilities of a predecessor corporation,
we will not use the defacto merger doctrine to circumvent the parties'
objective intent.
The Third Circuit's reasoning suggests that if two parties intend that
successor liability shall not obtain, the Court will respect those intentions.
If this is so, the opinion seriously undermines the very basis of the defacto
merger doctrine - that a court will use the doctrine to impose liability on
the successor in spite of the express intentions of the parties in an asset
purchase agreement to the contrary.
13
Some states have endeavored to legislatively repeal the defacto merger
doctrine. See, for example, Texas Business Corporation Act Article 5.10B,
which provides that in relevant part that "[a] disposition of any, all, or
substantially all, of the property and assets of a corporation . . . (1) is not
considered to be a merger or conversion pursuant to this Act or otherwise;
and (2) except as otherwise expressly provided by another statute, does not
make the acquiring corporation, foreign corporation, or other entity
responsible or liable for any liability or obligation of the selling corporation
that the acquiring corporation, foreign corporation, or other entity did not
expressly assume." 4
2. CONTINUITY OF ENTERPISE
As above noted, the defacto merger doctrine has generally involved a
transaction which looks like a merger in which the selling corporation has
gone out of existence and its stockholders have received stock of the buyer.
In 1976 the Michigan Supreme Court took the defacto merger doctrine a step
further and eliminated the continuing stockholder requirement. In Turner
v. Bituminous Casualty Co., the Court was dealing with a transaction in which
the consideration was cash, rather than stock, and the Court concluded that
this fact alone should not produce a different result from that which would
obtain under a defacto merger analysis if the consideration had been stock'"
Under this continuity of enterprise test successor liability can be imposed
upon findings of: 1) continuity of the outward appearance of the enterprise,
its management personnel, physical plant, assets and general business
13 See H. Lawrence Tafe, II, The defacto MergerDo'trine Comes to Massachusetts Wherein the Exception
to the Rule Becomes the Rule, Boston BarJournal (November/December 1998).
14 See Byron F. Egan and Curtis W. Huff, Choice of State of Incorporation - Texas ersus Delaware:
Is it Now Time to Rethink Traditional Notions, 54 SMU Law Review 249,288-290 (Winter 2001).
is Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883 (Mich. 1976).
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operations; 2) the prompt dissolution of the predecessor following the
transfer of assets; and 3) the assumption of those liabilities and obligations
necessary to the uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations.
These are essentially the same ingredients which support the defacto merger
doctrine - but without the necessity of showing continuity of shareholder
ownership.
3. PRODUCT LINE EXCEPTION
In 1977 California took a slightly different tack in holding a successor
liable in a products liability case. In Ray v. Alad Corp., the buyer had acquired
essentially all of the seller's assets including plant, equipment, inventories,
trade name, goodwill, etc. and had also employed all of its factory
personnel.16 The buyer continued to manufacture the same line ofproducts
under the seller's name and generally continued the seller's business as
before. Successor liability was found by the California Supreme Court:
A party which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the
output of its line of products under the circumstances here presented
assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product
line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from
which the business was acquired.
The rationale for this doctrine had moved a long way from the corporate
statutory merger analysis of the de facto merger doctrine. The Court
determined that the plaintiff had no remedy against the original
manufacturer by reason of the successor's acquisition of the business and
consequent ability of the successor to assume the original manufacturer's
risk. The Court also determined that the responsibility of the successor to
assume the risk for previously manufactured product was essentially the price
which the buyer had paid for the seller's good will and the buyer's ability to
enjoy the fruits of that good will.' 7
4. CHOICE OF LAW
Of those states which have considered the issues directly, many more
have rejected the product line exception than have embraced it. However,
because choice of law principles, especially in the area of product liability,
16 Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
17 See also Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981).
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may find the law of a state in which an injury occurs to be applicable, the
reach of those states which have embraced either the product line exception
or the narrower continuity of interest doctrine may be beyond their
respective borders.
5. ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
In 1980 the federal Superfund law was enacted - Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation And Liability Act Of 1980
("CERCLA").18 In the years since the enactment of that statute,
environmental issues have become a central - and often dominant - feature
of acquisitions. Moreover, in creating liability of a current owner for the
costs of cleaning up contamination caused by a prior owner, the statute
effectively preempted the ability of a buyer to refuse to accept liability for the
sins of the seller or seller's predecessor. Unlike the theories discussed above
which might impose successor liability on a buyer if certain facts appeal to
certain courts, CERCLA determined that every buyer would be liable for
certain environmental liabilities regardless of the provisions of any
acquisition agreement or any common law doctrines or state statutes.
In addition to CERCLA, a number of states have enacted Superfund-type
statutes with similar provisions to CERCLA. Further, as indicated above, the
defacto merger and continuity of enterprise doctrines have been applied in
environmental cases in states where courts have adopted one or more
variations of those themes.
C. Some Suggested Responses
1. ANALYSIS OF TRANSACTION
The first step in determining whether a proposed asset purchase will
involve any substantial risk of successor liability is to analyze the facts
involved in the particular transaction in light of the developments of the
various theories of successor liability above discussed. It is clear that product
liability and environmental liability pose serious threats as many of the
significant developments in the law of successor liability seem to involve
either product liabilities or environmental liabilities.
is 42 U.S.C. SS 9601-967 (1980).
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a. Product Liability
It may well be that the company whose assets are the subject of the
transaction will not have any product liability problem by reason of the
nature of its business. Moreover, even if the company to be acquired does
sell products which create some potential liability issues, in the course of due
diligence the buyer may be able to make some reasonable judgments with
respect to the potential for problems based upon the past history of the
selling company. Obviously one can also rely on insurance, on an
occurrence basis if previously carried by the seller and on a claims-made basis
in respect of insurance to be carried by the buyer. It may also be possible to
acquire a special policy relating only to products manufactured by the seller
prior to the closing and to build in the cost of that policy to the purchase
price.
b. Environmental
On the environmental front a similar analysis must be made. There are
obviously some types of businesses which present very high-risk situations
for buyers. As above noted there are both federal and state statutes which
will impose liabilities on successors regardless of the form of the transaction.
At the same time, the SmithKline Beecham case confirms that the doctrine of
defacto merger may well cause a successor to be subject to much greater
liability than would be imposed directly by CERCLA or other statutes.
Accordingly, the due diligence on the environmental front, in addition to all
of the customary environmental analyses done in any asset purchase, may
well require an analysis of prior transactions and prior owners.
c. Applicable Laws
In addition to analyzing the particular facts which might give rise to
successor liability for either products or environmental concerns, one should
obviously also review the laws which might be applicable if a successor
liability issue were to arise. The more expansive doctrines of successor
liability above mentioned have been adopted by a relatively small number of
states, and it may be that in a particular transaction one can determine that
the risk of such doctrines applying in the aftermath of a particular acquisition
transaction is very low.
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2. STRUCTURE OF TRANSACTION
If a transaction is likely to be subject to one or more of the doctrines of
successor liability, it might be possible to structure the asset purchase in the
manner which avoids one or more of the factors upon which courts rely in
finding successor liability. In all likelihood the business considerations will
dictate most of the essential elements of how the transaction will be put
together - and in particular how the business will be run by the buyer in the
future. However, since continuity of the seller's business into the buyer's
period of ownership is a common theme in all of the current successor
liability doctrines, it may be possible for the buyer to take steps to eliminate
some of the elements upon which a successor liability case could be founded.
Thus continuity of management, personnel, physical location, trade names
and the like are matters over which the buyer has some control after the asset
purchase and might be managed in a way to reduce the risk of successor
liability in a close case.
3. ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT PROVISIONS
a. Liabilities Excluded
If the buyer is to have any hope of avoiding unexpected liabilities in an
asset transaction, the contract between the buyer and the seller must be
unambiguous as to what liabilities the buyer is and is not assuming. In any
transaction in which a buyer is acquiring an ongoing business, the buyer is
likely to be assuming certain of the seller's liabilities, especially obligations
incurred by seller in the ordinary course of seller's business. Indeed, it is
likely to be very important to the buyer in dealing with the seller's creditors,
vendors, customers, etc. that the asset purchase be viewed in a seamless
process in which the buyer hopes to get the benefit of seller's goodwill for
which the buyer has paid. Under these circumstances however, it is most
important that the contract be very clear as to which liabilities the buyer is
expressly not assuming. See Section 2.4 in Appendix A to this article.
b. Indemnification
As a practical matter, probably the most effective protection of a buyer
against successor liability is comprehensive indemnification by the seller,
particularly if indemnification is backstopped by a portion of the purchase
price held in escrow. See Section 11 in Appendix H to this article.
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4. SELLING CORPORATION - SURVIVAL
The dissolution of the selling corporation is a factor which the courts
have consistently taken into account in successor liability cases. While it may
be placing form over substance, if the seller's dissolution were delayed, one
of the elements of the successor liability rationale would at least be in doubt.
5. LIMITATION ON ASSETS
In creating a corporate structure for the asset purchase, buyer should
keep in mind the desirability of limiting the assets of the acquired enterprise
which might be accessible to a plaintiff in a future successor liability case.
Thus, if in the last analysis the buyer is to be charged with a liability created
by the seller or a predecessor of the seller, it would be helpful to the buyer
if assets available to satisfy that claim were limited in some manner. There
may be no way as a practical matter to achieve this result in a manner
consistent with the business objectives of the buyer. However, if, for
example, the particular line of business with serious product liability
concerns were acquired by a separate corporation and thereafter operated
consistent with principles which would prevent veil-piercing, at least the
buyer would have succeeded in placing a reasonable cap on the successor
liability exposure.
V. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
An asset acquisition is like many other legal transactions involving
multiple parties with potentially different goals and interests.
The Model Asset Purchase Agreement and commentary refer to the Buyer
and Seller as single entities. In the fact pattern of the Model Asset Purchase
Agreement the Seller will be joined by significant shareholders of Seller in its
representations, warranties and indemnification obligations. While a seller
and its shareholders may share a uniform interest in the sale, they also will
typically have differing interests in the transaction (e.g., post-closing
employment by the Buyer, noncompetition agreements and whether and
how much separate consideration will be received by an individual
shareholder for his or her agreement to be employed or not to compete,
which typically comes out of the overall amount the Buyer is willing to pay
for the Seller's assets; and arrangements for sharing indemnification
responsibilities among one or more principals of the Seller, to mention but
a few).
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Often all of the parties related to the seller will ask that one lawyer
represent the entire group, especially if the deal is not large and the seller is
closely held. Such a situation requires careful consideration by the lawyer to
identify each of the potential multiple clients and to evaluate potential and
actual conflicts of interest that may exist or arise among these group
members, or between any one or more of them and other clients or former
clients tangentially related to the transaction (e.g., landlords, lien holders,
guarantee holders, etc.). Evaluating potential conflicts can require significant
due diligence by the lawyer to identify not only those conflicts apparent at
the beginning of the transaction, but also those which may become evident
as the transaction progresses.
In determining the appropriateness of representing multiple clients, the
substantive and procedural implications of Rule 2.2 of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct should be considered. These include consultation
with each individual client about the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality
and the attorney-client privilege. Written consent after consultation may be
required. Furthermore, once the attorney-client relationship has been
established with each member of the group, each client has the right to loyal
and diligent representation with the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in
Rule 1.16, and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a former
client. Under Rule 2.2 the lawyer must withdraw from the representation
if any one of the multiple clients so requests, or, if one or more of the clients
denies the lawyer the authority to disclose certain information to any of the
remaining clients, thereby preventing the lawyer from being able to discharge
the lawyers duties to the remaining clients. Furthermore, absent unusual
circumstances upon withdrawal from representation of any one client, the
lawyer may not proceed with the representation of any of the remaining
clients, including the seller, unless each of the multiple clients and former
clients after consultation consents in writing to the continued representation.
Rules 1.6, 1.8(b), 1.9 and 1.10 protect the interests of the former client.
Therefore, the lawyer must be mindful that, if the common representation
fails, the result can be significant additional cost, embarrassment and
recrimination with the potential for considerable harm to the interests of one
or more of the clients.
VI. ORGANIZATION OF MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT
A. Structure
The structure of the Model Asset Purchase Agreement follows current
practice:
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Article I contains a glossary of defined terms, as well as general guides to
construction and interpretation. This article enhances ease of usage and
organization of the acquisition agreement and includes cross-references to
definitions in various places in the agreement.
Article 2 contains the economic and operative terms of the acquisition,
including the assets to be acquired, the consideration to be paid, and the basic
mechanics of the closing.
Articles 3 and 4 are the representations and warranties of the Seller and the
Buyer, respectively. The representations and warranties are statements of
fact that exist or will exist at the time of the Closing. The Seller's
representations and warranties, which contain detailed statements about its
business, are much more comprehensive than the Buyer's and include
extensive provisions regarding matters such as environmental problems,
employee benefits, and intellectual property that could result in significant
liabilities for the Buyer after the Closing if not covered by adequate
representations and warranties (and the corresponding indemnification
obligations) by the Seller and its principal shareholders. The Buyer's
representations and warranties deal mainly with the Buyer's ability to enter
into the acquisition agreement and to consummate the acquisition.
Articles 5 and 6 contain covenants in which the parties commit to perform
(affirmative covenants) or not to perform (negative covenants) certain acts in
the period between signing the acquisition agreement and closing the
acquisition. The main burden of the covenants falls on the Seller, which
must take organizational steps toward consummating the acquisition and
operate its business in the manner provided after signing the agreement and
before the closing.
Articles 7 and 8 contain conditions precedent to the obligations of the
Buyer and the Seller, respectively, to consummate the acquisition. These
sections specify what each party is entitled to expect from the other at the
Closing. If a condition is not satisfied by one party, the other party may be
able to elect not to complete the acquisition.
Article 9 outlines the circumstances in which each party may terminate
the acquisition agreement and the effects of such termination.
Article 10 contains certain additional covenants of the parties.
Article 11 contains indemnification provisions giving each party specific
remedies for the other's breach of certain obligations under the acquisition
agreement. These provisions cover matters such as calculation of damages,
recovery of expenses and costs (including legal fees) in addition to damages
(a right that may not exist absent an indemnification provision), and
procedures for claiming damages.
Article 12 contains comprehensive confidentiality and access to
information provisions, which are applicable both prior to and after the
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closing and supersede the confidentiality agreement previously entered into
between the parties.
Article 13 contains general provisions such as notice, severability, and
choice of law.
B. Letter of Intent
In some transactions, the parties do not sign a binding agreement until
the closing. If a letter of intent has been executed that includes a no-shop
provision and gives the buyer adequate opportunity to conduct due diligence,
the buyer may resist becoming contractually bound until it is ready to close.
Conversely, the seller has an interest in not permitting extensive due
diligence until the buyer is contractually bound. This is especially so in
circumstances in which the buyer is a competitor or in which the seller is
concerned that the due diligence process will necessitate or risk disclosure to
employees, customers or competitors that the business is for sale.
C. Gap Between Signing and Closing
Occasionally it is the seller that is reluctant to sign before the closing.
This may be the case, for example, if the seller has announced that the
business is for sale, has several potential buyers and does not want to
preclude talking to alternative buyers until the seller is certain that the
transaction will close.
Sometimes a simultaneous signing and closing occurs because the
transaction simply evolves that way. The parties may be negotiating an
agreement that contemplates a period between signing and closing, but the
due diligence may proceed more rapidly than the negotiations, and it may
develop that a waiting period would be pointless or even harmful to the
transaction. In such circumstances, counsel should consider whether it is
appropriate to remove from the agreement the pre-closing covenants,
conditions to the parties' obligations to close, and other provisions rendered
unnecessary by the decision to sign and close simultaneously. Care should
be taken to ensure that no contractual obligation applicable post-closing is
affected by such changes.
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IV. TRANSCRIPT OF MOCK NEGOTIATION OF AN ASSET
ACQUISITION19
Introduction
DENNIS HERSCH:
LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
DENNIS HERSCH:
SAMUEL THOMPSON:
(Moderator)
Welcome to our program, Mock Negotiation of an
Asset Acquisition. On the panel today, we have
Vice Chancellor Jack Jacobs of the Delaware
Chancery Court; next to him, Frank Balotti of
Richards Layton & Finger in Wilmington. They
will act as commentators on various points
raised in the negotiation. Sam Thompson will
act as moderator, and our negotiators are Larry
Tafe, a partner in the Boston office of Day,
Berry & Howard, who will represent the target,
and Byron Egan, a partner ofJackson Walker in
Dallas, who will represent the acquiror. For the
last five years, Byron and Larry have spent a
good deal of time as Co-Chairs of the Task
Force of the ABA Negotiated Acquisitions
Committee drafting a Model Asset Acquisition
Agreement, which will be published by the ABA
within the next few months. If it is a success,
we may try and turn it into a movie. We haven't
cast Larry yet, but I think Anthony Hopkins will
do Byron just great.
I'll take Robert Redford.
You got it. Gentlemen, the floor is yours.
Background
Okay, we are going to ask Larry to give us the
background of this transaction, which starts out
as a stock acquisition and then moves to an asset
acquisition. Larry.
19 Introduction by Dennis S. Hersch, Davis Polk &Wardwell, NewYork.
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LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
Thank you, Sam and Dennis. As Dennis
indicated, Byron and I have spent a fair amount
of time together over the last five or actually
approaching six years as we have co-chaired a
task force at the ABA which has been working
on the Model Asset Acquisition Agreement,20
which you mentioned. And this was really the
second big project of our ABA Committee, the
first being the Model Stock Purchase
Agreement," which some of you may, I hope,
own in your libraries. It has been great fun
working on these projects.
As Sam indicated, the way we are going to
go about this is to have Byron and I do a
negotiation on behalf of a seller and a buyer in
what we think will be an asset transaction and to
highlight some of the issues in the asset world.
We are going to assume that this transaction was
initially structured as a stock transaction and
then was converted into an asset transaction. We
hope we can draw some comparisons and
parallels and differences. We are starting off
with a publicly held conglomerate, which we
will refer to as Parent. The business being sold
by "Parent" has been operated primarily as a
subsidiary, which we will refer to as "Target".
We have discovered since the transaction was
initially structured as a stock deal that there may
well be some assets outside of Target and held
by Parent that may also have to be transferred in
the transactions. Parent may also license the use
of certain intellectual property.
As I indicated, initially we structured the
deal as a stock transaction. Target accounts for
a substantial part of the business of the Parent
company, and in round numbers, we have
figured that the percentage of assets that the
parent will be selling, including the sub assets
2D Model Asset Purchase Agreement, supra, note 1.
21 American Bar Association, Model Stock Purchase Agreement (1995).
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would be 55 percent, but that it does contribute
upwards of 80 percent of the Parent profits.
Finally, we should tell you as indicated, it is a
management buyout and that indeed, the chief
-executive officer of Parent (the "CEO") is on
both sides of the deal. That is, he is going to go
with the management buyout team and the
financial people that are acquiring Target.
I will represent the selling entity, Parent and
Target, and Byron will represent the buying
entity, which we will refer to as "Buyer". All the
corporations are Delaware corporations. Sam
will moderate, and Frank and Jack will pipe in
on some issues of Delaware law as we go along.
As a final background fact, it has been
determined that there are assets of Parent not
inside Target that have to be transferred either
by outright transfer or by license or something
else to Target. On the other side of it, Buyer has
become concerned about exposure in the
intellectual property area. So the Buyer is talking
now about doing an asset transaction, pursuant
to which it would acquire the assets of Target
and related assets held by Parent. So with that
background, I would ask Byron to talk a little bit
about some of the issues that we may be
discussing.
Stock Acquisition Converted Into Asset Acquisition
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
Thank you, Larry. We did do a term sheet early
in this deal that contemplated that we would be
buying the stock of this subsidiary because we
thought that was where all of the business that
we were buying really was. That is the way they
have been operating. But as the due diligence
proceeded after we signed a confidentiality
agreement, we found that in fact there were
assets in Parent and employees of Parent that are
properly associated with the business of Target.
We also found that there were technology
licenses held by Target that have some
ASSETACQUISITIONS
problems. We have got some infringement
claims that are out there, patent infringement
claims running against Target, and we are
worried about successor liability. We are
worried that if we buy the stock of Target, we
are going to be buying liabilities that we did not
plan on. So what we would like to propose,
Larry, is that this is a classic case for doing an
asset transaction. We could get the assets we
need by buying the assets of Target and then
buying the piece of Parent that goes along with
Target's assets. We would buy assets from both
Parent and Target, and we would assume those
liabilities that we need, including certain
contracts. We will leave you with these
liabilities that we are concerned with. We also
have the issue of employees. Some of the
employees we want are in Target and some are
in Parent, and we would ask you to just
terminate all these people and let us pick who
we want. We believe that we can do that under
applicable state law. There may be a couple of
union contracts we have got to work, with but I
think we can solve that. So Larry, I would like
to propose to you that we structure the
transaction as an asset purchase. I realize that
there are some theories of successor liability and
it may be that we cannot absolutely be sure that
there will not be any liabilities, but that will give
our litigators something to fight about. So in
the hope that you would go along with us in this
transaction and do an asset acquisition, I sent
over last night to you my standard form of asset
purchase agreement. It is a reasonable buyer's
first draft based on the ABA Negotiated
Acquisition Committee's Model Asset
Acquisition Agreement, and so I do not think
you will have any problem. And what I would
like to do is work through some of the
provisions with you. To begin this process,
what we probably ought to do is look at what I
call "wockitywock" section - the section of the
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agreement that is probably the most important
because it defines what assets are being sold or
retained and what liabilities are being assumed
or retained.
LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel
What is that again?
Negotiation of Assets to be Acquired
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
It is the section that is most important.
Wockitywock?
That is right. It is the engine - it specifies the
assets that are going to be transferred and the
assets that are not going to be transferred, and
the liabilities that are going to be assumed by
Buyer, and the assets and the liabilities that are
going to be retained by Seller. And so we begin
with Article 2, which is set out in Appendix A to
this article.
Larry, as I said, this is my standard form
agreement. This was drafted by the ABA
Committee in the context of the acquisition of
a closely held corporation. Here, however, we
are in essence buying a division and we are going
to need to make some modifications. So what I
would like to do is run through the provisions
with you in a hurry. You do not have to agree
with everything right now. This is not carved in
stone, although I will admit that hammer and
the chisel are in hand. Let us just run through
it. Section 2.1 is entitled "Assets to be Sold" and
it sets out the assets to be sold. Section 2.1 says
we will buy from Target all of the assets of every
kind of Target, except the "Excluded Assets."
Then we have a laundry list of the assets that we
are going to try to get, which will necessitate lots
of schedules and lots of details about the assets
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LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
LARRYTAFE:
(Target Counsel)
that we are buying. This is important. Where
the lawyers make the money for their clients is
by being sure that in an asset deal, the client gets
all the assets that produce the revenue stream
that it thinks it is buying. On the other side, it
is important to exclude whatever liabilities the
buyer does not want.
Could I just pipe in and say that transferring all
of the assets of the Target is fine. We were
going to do that when we are doing the stock
deal, but we are obviously not selling all of the
assets of Parent. So we are talking about two
sellers essentially, one ofwhich would be selling
in asset transaction all of the assets of Target, but
Parent would be selling only some assets that are
necessary to make Target's whole business
operate.
You are absolutely right. Since the definition of
Seller in the Model Agreement is the selling
corporation, we are going to have to change the
definition a little bit. Here we will have two
sellers and we need to consider using a defined
term of "Business" here, as is frequently done in
the context of the division acquisition. In fact,
most asset purchase agreements you will see will
include a definition of Business, which is
intended to pick up the segment that includes
the revenue stream that the buyer thinks it is
buying. In the Comment to Section 2.1, you
have a definition of "Business" that I would
propose to use here. The definition would
include basically all of the assets of Target, and
it would also include all of the assets of Parent
that relate to this particular line of business.
Byron, on the issue of the definition of Business,
I think you are right. I .probably do need a
definition of Business, but I am also going to be
careful about how it is used. This Business has
been primarily operated as a subsidiary. We did
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not need a definition of Business when we were
talking about simply selling the stock of the
entity. If you sell the stock of the entity, the
business goes with it. If we are going to define
Business in this agreement, we will include not
only acquired assets of Target but other related
assets including intellectual property assets held
by Parent.
Larry, you are right. This is one of those areas
where the difference between the right word
and the almost right word is the difference
between lightning bolt and lightning bug.
That was pretty good.
Excluded assets are also important. Ifyou are the
seller, you know that the buyer is paying for
certain things, but you find you are not getting
any value for certain other things, so what you
try to do is carve out and retain those assets you
are not getting any credit for in the purchase
price.
Negotiation of Liabilities to be Assumed
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
Then we move to Section 2.4 that has a simple
caption: "Liabilities". This is another definition
that is critical. As the buyer, we are going to do
this real simple. We will take trade payables that
are on the balance sheet and arise in the ordinary
course of business, and we will take liabilities
under scheduled contracts and other scheduled
liabilities. If a liability is not on a schedule, we
are not going to take it. We are particularly
going to be careful to identify a number of
specific liabilities that we are not taking. We are
not going to take any tax liabilities. We are not
going to take any liabilities relating to the
operation to the business prior to the closing
time. So it is real simple. We will take
ASSETACQUISITIONS
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scheduled liabilities and will leave the rest with
you.
That brings us to our first issue of contention.
When we determined that we would go from a
stock transaction to an asset transaction, we did
so for a couple of reasons: first, these additional
assets which have to somehow be dealt with in
order for you to get the business you want; and
second, your concern about a particular area of
exposure which Target has in the world of
intellectual property and whether there would
be some potential infringement claims and
whatnot. However, but for that one area of
concern, and in my view you are overly
concerned about it, in the transaction that we
had before you were going to buy the stock of
Target and take all the liabilities with it. Now
obviously, we were going to have to make
representations and warranties about Target.
We were going to have to indemnify you if
things came out of the woodwork that we had
not told you about and we are still prepared to
do that. But I do not know why, simply because
we have gone from a stock form to an asset
form, we have to then start with essentially
Buyer not assuming any liabilities of a going
concern unless they are on a list somewhere.
We have a full set of representations and
warranties and you have done a fair amount of
due diligence in the earlier stages of this
transaction in which you really know what
Target does and what it does not do. And the
bottom line is that your liabilities approach is a
change in substance in the deal rather than
simply a change in form to accommodate one
problem.
We would go back and forth on the issue of
assumed liabilities in a real deal because this is a
value point for the clients and the right words
here are critical. But at the end of the day, I am
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going to be very insistent that we take only
scheduled liabilities and the rest must remain
with the sellers. I am simply going to say: do
not cry down my back, you'll rust my spurs.
You see what I have to put up with it? This is six
years. You know how many of those I have
heard in six years?
Byron, your client presumably priced the stock
deal under the assumption that all the liabilities
were going to come over to buyer. Now you are
insisting that certain liabilities stay back. Now,
might you be willing to increase the purchase
price to compensate for the fact that you are now
only taking certain specified liabilities.
Thank you, Sam.
The problem is the risk of the unknown. In our
purchase price, we did not factor in anything for
the risk of the unknown, and so we are leaving
the risk of the unknown with who is in the best
position to know it.
When you originally structured the purchase
price for the stock deal, you had to price it on
certain unknown potential liabilities that were
coming over. But now you are not taking
certain liabilities. So it seems to me that you
ought to at least be able to ratchet up purchase
price.
I ought to, but I would say to that: Ifwishes were
horses, beggars would ride. And then we would
move on to the next issue.
Okay, on that note.
ASSETACQ UISITIONS
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Does that mean Byron won?
You can out number him, butyou can't beat him.
Negotiation Over Sale of Substantialy All the Assets
LARRYTAFE:
(Target Counsel)
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
LARRYTAFE:
(Target Counsel)
I want to talk to you, Byron, about a few of the
representations and warranties in the agreement.
I realize this is a first draft and I realize it is
designed as a form that is used primarily in the
context of the sale of an entire business. Even
with those caveats and even though you only
gave it to me last night at 10:00 which did not
give me a chance to read it very closely, I have
some initial problems.
What I gave you is a standard form of agreement.
You ought to know what is in it.
Section 3.2 (see Appendix B) is a pretty standard
provision regarding the due execution of the
agreement by seller and its enforceability, and I
do not have problems with the better part of it.
It does suggest that you are looking for a vote by
the shareholders of Parent. As you know, Parent
is a publicly held company listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and this transaction
involves about 55% of Parent's assets going and
80% of its profits. Parent will still have a couple
of viable businesses left after the sale, and one of
the reasons for this sale is to get some cash so
Parent can beef up its own business and do some
things. Parent does not want to bother with
proxy statements and shareholder votes in order
to do what is essentially a deal that is designed to
get it more strategically positioned in businesses
that it is not now in.
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Well, Larry, I will want that representation, plus
the opinion of Frank Balotti, as Delaware
counsel, that shareholder approval is not
required.
What are you willing to pay for it?
Well, it depends on whether you give me a clean
opinion or whether you have one of those chatty
opinions that reads sort of like a novel. You
know, he has these long opinions that go on and
on.
I am glad he is picking on somebody else.
Frank's opinions do not reach a plain English
conclusion. His opinions talk about a lot of
cases and say some of them go this way and
some of them go that way, and I always vote
with the cases.
And you will get the long one. It will be a
novella, it will cost you a tidy sum and it may
come out the other way. Are you willing to risk
that?
Please give us some color on that.
Okay, the Delaware law basically is that a Board
of Directors may sell, lease, or transfer all or
substantially all of the property of a corporation
as approved by the shareholders.2 In other
words, if you are selling all or substantially all of
the assets, a shareholder vote is required. There
is not a definition in the statute of what is
substantially all. However, Delaware case law,
See DeI.Gen.Corp.lw S 271 (2001).
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the case law Byron does not want to read about,
has developed a two-pronged test to help those
in need of guidance come to a conclusion as to
whether or not a shareholder vote is required.
The first part of the test is what's called a
qualitative test, in which you look at the assets
being sold to try and determine whether they are
the longtime assets of the company. You ask. Is
it the business the company has been in forever?
Are you changing the business of the company?
The second part of the test is the
quantitative test, which tries to measure the
percentage of the assets being sold as against the
entire asset base of the company. In this
instance, we have 55% of the fair market value of
the assets being sold. That is a gray area. It is
not absolutely clear one-way or the other in the
minds of most people whether or not 55%
constitutes substantially all or something less
than substantially all. So you look elsewhere.
And the elsewhere we have in this fact pattern is
the assets being sold generate 80% of the income
of the company. That certainly tips in favor of
these assets being substantially all and in this
instance, I would recommend that a shareholder
vote be obtained.
But that does not end the inquiry because
you need to determine which shareholder vote
is required, that of Parent or of Target. Let us
ignore the assets of Parent which are coming
along with this transaction and concentrate on
the fact that Target, a subsidiary of Parent, is
selling all of its assets. It is easy to obtain the
vote of the stockholder of the subsidiary,
because the stockholder of the subsidiary is
Parent. Under Delaware law, when a subsidiary
sells all or substantially all of its assets, the vote
that is required is the vote of the parent, not the
public stockholders of the parent. But things are
not quite that simple because those assets had to
get to the subsidiary somehow some time. Ifthe
assets were dropped down from the parent level
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to a subsidiary level without a vote of the parent
shareholders, it would cause questions to be
raised.
You have to look back and see how the assets
came to be in the subsidiary. There is a
difference in opinion among Delaware
practitioners of whether a vote is required in all
instances when assets are dropped down. If a
parent drops down substantially all of its assets
to a subsidiary, some firms take the view that
there are circumstances in which a vote is not
required. Other law firms, such as ours, take the
view that if you drop down all or substantially all
of the assets to a subsidiary, a vote of the parent
stockholders is required. Now in this instance,
if the assets were dropped down originally
without a vote, then we may tell you that despite
the fact there are assets of the subsidiary being
sold, you might now need the vote of the parent
public stockholders.
I would like to add one thing to what Frank said
to put the issue in perspective. The question is
why would the buyer care if the seller has a
problem with its stockholders; that is if the
stockholder vote would be needed in order to
authorize the sale? And the answer is, at least in
Delaware, and I think in some other
jurisdictions, is that if under the corporate
statute of the seller's jurisdiction, a shareholder
vote is required and it is not obtained, then the
sale is void. So your client, the buyer, is going to
be party to a void sale and subject to having the
assets that it purchased recaptured in some way,
which you certainly do not want for your client.
However, it is also correct to say that the law as
to whether or not a shareholder vote is required
varies greatly from jurisdiction tojurisdiction, as
Larry and Byron will explain in a minute.
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Frank, if I understood your analysis of Delaware
law, it would lead me to conclude that if this
were a sale by Parent of the stock of its
subsidiary, Target, then a shareholder vote
would be required at the Parent company level.
Correct, because the Parent is then selling all or
substantially all of its assets measured on a fair
market basis, i.e., the stock of the sub.
But when the sub, which is the wholly owned
sub of the Parent, sells its assets, the transaction
is not deemed to be a sale of the Parent of its
assets.
That is correct.
The economic substance of those two
transactions is the same. The Parent ends up
with cash.
You cannot overlook the doctrine of independent
legal significance in Delaware. If it is the
subsidiary that is selling assets, in theory it
receives the cash and dividends up or distributes
the cash up to the Parent. You cannot re-
characterize the transaction to be a sale by the
Parent of its assets because that is not the
transaction.
There is no uncertainty in Delaware law on that
issue?
There is not a Supreme Court decision that
definitively sets all this out so yes, there is some
uncertainty. There are several Chancery Court
decisions that tell you that the vote required
when you sell assets of a subsidiary is the vote of
the Parent, not the Parent's stockholders. There
is not a decision that goes on and talks about the
drop down issue. That is lore that has been
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developed by the lawyers in Delaware because
we get that question frequently.
But you would really have form over substance
if you had an honest-to-God holding company
that held nothing but stock in five subs which is
not an unusual operating arrangement in some
circumstances, and decide to sell out. I gather
you are saying that if they sell the stock of all of
its subs, Parent has to go to its shareholders
because it is clearly selling all of its assets. If
they decide to structure those deals the way
Egan wants everything structured so he is not
going to get hit by any lawsuits or anything and
they sell assets of all those subs, there is an
argument that they can do that and not have to
go to the shareholders of the parent.
Correct. In theory, if the assets have been
dropped down from the holding company to the
subs, the shareholders have voted on it at some
point on the drop down, knowing the
consequences of that drop down.
Larry, he who lives by the sword, dies by the
sword. You can change the character of a
corporation's business simply by leveraging up,
by adding assets and incurring debt. So why not
look at this issue in a simple fashion and say if a
corporation is going to continue in business after
the transactionjust a different form of business,
then shareholders should not have a vote on it
because that is ordinarily within the preview of
the board of directors. There is nothing in
Delaware law that says if you change your
business, you have got to have shareholder
approval, so why should this little segment of a
change, called a sale of assets, require
shareholder vote? So our view in Texas, and the
Texas Business Corporation Act now says, that
if you are going to continue in any business no
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shareholder vote is required.' For instance, if
you sell your manufacturing business and
continue as a holding company doing
investments, shareholder approval is not
required. Larry, has the Model Business
Corporation Act taken a similar approach?
Yes, they have. As long as there is a continuing
substantial business, that is the way they deal
with it.
I think that under the Model Business
Corporation Act if the selling company does not
continue a significant business a shareholder
vote is required.24 The Model Act no longer uses
the concept of substantially all the assets. I
would think that in this context, where Parent
retains 45% of its assets and 15% of its revenues,
assuming the assets and revenues reflect an
ongoing business, a shareholder vote would
likely not be required under the Model Act.
So under almost any jurisdiction's law, except
perhaps Texas, there is a lot of slicing and dicing
and careful analyzing that the lawyer for the
seller needs to do and the lawyer for the buyer is
going to be equally concerned about.
Well, we could move on past this by simply
pointing you to the commentary to Section 3.2
in the ABA Model Asset Purchase Agreement.
Negotiation Over Sufficiency of Assets Representation
LARRYTAFE:
(Target Counsel)
Let me go on to some other representations here
that I think need some attention. In Section 3.6
(see Appendix C) there is what looks like a
23 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. Art. 5.09 (2001); see Byron F. Egan and Curtis W. H-uff, Choie of State of
Incorporation - Texas versus Delaware: Is It Now Time to Rethink Traditional Notions?, 54 SMU Law Review
249,287-290 (Winter 2001).
24 Model. Bus. Corp. Act. S 12.02 (1999).
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perfectly benign statement that says in substance
that there are sufficient assets here to run the
business as we have been running it. And
obviously, we have no problem with that when
we were talking about the assets of a subsidiary,
although I am not even sure that the
representation would have been appropriate if
we were selling stock of a subsidiary. But I do
want to be sure that we do not have a trap here
where we define a business and then tell you
that you are not going to have to do anything
more than we are now doing in order to run that
business. It may well need some new
technology. It may well need a lot of things and
the vagueness of your new idea of having a
definition of business gives me some concern
with this representation that I might not
otherwise have, particularly since your guys,
including the CEO who is going over to Buyer
in the transaction, know more about this damn
thing than the rest of the people in Parent.
Well, Larry, I am going to send you a bottle of
Gelusil at the end of the day, but I need Section
3.6 because I need to know that my client is
getting all the assets that it needs to produce that
stream of revenues that it formulated its
purchase price on. That is what Section 3.6 is
intended to do. So Larry, you ought to be
satisfied.
Byron, let me ask you a question. How is Larry
supposed to know what assets you formulated
your price on since he was not in the room
when you formulated your price?
He gave my client some division financial
statements that included revenues from the
business being sold. I want to be sure that my
client gets all the assets that produced that
stream of revenues.
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Okay, including interest on cash on deposits?
We are not buying cash.
Then you are not getting all of the assets which
produce the revenues. But there is an exception.
Section 3.6 provides "Except as disclosed in Part
3.6."
That is exactly right, Sam.
So it is up to him to list what does not come
over.
Absolutely!
Not fair.
You know, it is worse than not fair. It is totally
irrelevant.
Negotiation Over No Undisclosed Liabilities
LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
Let us talk about no the undisclosed liabilities
representation, which is Section 3.13 (see
Appendix D). That is a representation that in
substance I do not have any problem with except
that we are now talking about the sale to the
extent that the representation applies to Parent.
You do not need Section 3.13 because Buyer is
not going to assume any of those liabilities
anyway unless they are on a list of Assumed
Liabilities. So whether there exist other
liabilities in Target or whether there are other
liabilities in Parent, you should not give a hoot
because you just said back in Section 2.2(a) that
20021
188 UNIVERSI7Y OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 10:145
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
FRANK BALOTTI:
(Commentator)
LARRYTAFE:
(Target Counsel)
if you do not see that liability on my list of
Assumed Liabilities, I do not assume it.
Folks, I do care and I care for two reasons. This
is a due diligence function. As you know,
representations and warranties have two
functions: one is shifting responsibility and the
other is due diligence. And in Section 3.13, 1 am
trying to find out, and perhaps shift some
responsibility in the process, whether this
business produces liabilities that my client does
not know about that it is not assuming, because
liabilities of that kind may recur in the future
and may be a cost item for my client in the
future. Secondly, I am leaving liabilities with
Larry's client and I am going to make various
efforts to be sure that his client keeps money in
the corporation to satisfy those liabilities. At the
end of the day, there is a possibility that his
client will not be able to satisfy them and the
creditors will come after my client. So I want to
know what liabilities exist. That knowledge will
give my client a chance to structure a deal where
my client will be protected.
Do you buy that Larry?
No. I think it is customary to give the
representation and warranty, but I am not sure
that it is necessary.
Negotiation Over the Taxes Representation and Warranty
LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
Let us talk about the taxes representation and
warranty, which is Section 3.14, (see Appendix
E). That gets even further afield. You certainly
do not need Parent to tell you that Parent has
paid all its taxes. I understand that there may
well be some local or state taxes which may
constitute liens on assets which get triggered by
the transfer. We will certainly represent to you
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that the assets your client buys will be free and
clear of liens, and we will take whatever steps are
required to get releases of those liens from the
state or other authorities. In terms of the overall
tax history of Parent and indeed Target, which
you are not buying, you do not need to know a
damn thing about our taxes. You can take all of
Section 3.14 and get rid of it because you are
going to take assets into a new entity. You are
going to start with clean slate. You are going to
set up your books. That entity is not going to
owe 15 cents of taxes to anybody on day 1. And
your client certainly is not going to owe any of
ours. So I do not want to go through these
pages and pages of representations and
warranties about taxes which should be of no
concern to you.
Sam, do you want to explain to him why we
need this.
Larry, first with respect to state sales taxes, there
could be successor liability here in that they
could carry over under state statutes. For
example, in Florida, right here in this state, any
unpaid state taxes would simply carry over to the
acquiring company.2" So there is a strong
incentive for the acquiring company to make
sure that the target company's state taxes have
been paid. While you are right that the federal
income tax liability from the sale is not going to
carry over, it is possible, that there could be
encumbrances on the assets from federal tax
liens. For this reason, we have in Section
3.14(a) a representation that there are no such
encumbrances arising from prior federal tax
liability.
Furthermore, we want to understand this
business, and one of the ways to understand this
Fla. Stat. Ann. S 212.10 (2001).
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business is to look at the returns you have filed
with the various tax authorities that set forth the
tax positions you have taken with respect to this
business. This will give us a better fundamental
understanding of the business and will identify
tax issues that we are likely to face in the future.
So this is standard. We are asking that the tax
returns that were required to have been filed
were filed and that the taxes were paid. We want
copies of those returns. We want to know that
there were proper accruals. In particular, we
want to know whether there have been any tax
sharing or similar arrangements between Parent
and Target. These things will give us a way of
verifying some of the fundamental economic
assumptions we have made about this
transaction. So I think it is a situation where we
are protecting ourselves and not hurting you.
I guess that you are probably right, although if it
becomes a due diligence function, strictly an
informational tool, I want to be sure before we
sign off on these representations and warranties
that we do not have any liability. If I am right
that you are not going to have any liability,
putting aside the things that might carry over,
then I guess the question for me is why not just
give the representation and not worry about it,
because Parent is never going to have to answer
to it. But I do not think that is a constructive
way to go about representations and warranties.
If you need the representation and warranty in
order to be protected if I breach it, it is because
you have some concern that there would be
liability running to you if it were breached. And
if the answer is: there is no any way with respect
to federal tax liability that you are ever going to
bear any responsibility for it whether I breach
the representation or not, then it seems a little
silly.
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LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
Let us turn to Section 3.33, which is what I call
the "10b-5 rep" (see Appendix F). The first
thing this says is that everything else said in the
representations and warranties is not untrue.
And I love that because at the law school I went
to, when you make representations, you do not
have to say at the end of every representation
and that it is the truth. What the hell does it add
to anything to say that all the statements in here
are not untrue?
I think it does. And furthermore, why do you
have any trouble reaffirming that you have told
us everything?
I knew you were going to ask me that.
Further, we are talking about an asset deal, and
securities laws are not applicable to asset trans-
actions unless there is a security involved. So by
buying assets instead of the stock of a subsidiary,
my client does not have the benefit of SEC Rule
10b-5 since I do not have Rule 10b-5 protection
so I try to get it contractually. This is a bit
broad, but I think it's a valid provision.
Well, the more troublesome part of this
representation is the part dealing with the
statement that there are no materials facts
omitted that are necessary in light of, and all that
good stuff that we know and love. And it seems
to me that you have served up an agreement that
has thirty-three representations and warranties,
umpteen covenants, forty-two closing
conditions, and sixty-two indemnifications and
the agreement will run a couple of hundred
pages when we are all done here and really what
you want me to say is that I will warrant to you
here that you have not forgot to ask for
2002]
192 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 10:145
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
Discussion of Fiduciary
LARRYTAFE:
(Target Counsel)
FRANK BALOTTI:
(Commentator)
VICE C14ANCEUORJACOBS:
(Commentator)
something. You have full access to the company
to do all your due diligence and ask any
questions you want to ask. You have got
representations here that overlap each other
fourteen ways to Sunday. There is nothing left
that you can ask about this company and the
notion that I would give you what I would
loosely characterize as a gotcha provision that
says that essentially that if you have forgotten to
ask something, my client is going to fill the gap
when your client screws the company up and it
goes down the tubes. On the street I grew up
on, they would have called that chutzpa.
But we are moving on.
Duty Issues with Delaware Counsel and the Vice
Chancellor
Next we want to talk about the issues that arise
in view of the fact that we have a management
buyout. We have an internal conflict of interest
since the CEO of Parent is a shareholder of the
Buyer. We need help from our brethren from
Delaware, Frank Balotti and Vice Chancellor
JackJacobs.
I will seek an advisory opinion from the Judge.
Ijust wanted to tell all of you candidly that I am
finding it very difficult to be the straight man in
this group of comics. And I want to assure you
that when I was a lawyer, I used to have a sense
of humor. And before I became a Judge, I was
even allowed to display it. Having said that, we
all know that an asset sale is primarily a creature
of commercial law, and it is necessary to take
account of fraudulent conveyance acts and to
factor in the impact of the Bankruptcy Code and
so forth. However, there are parts ofthe process
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where the corporation law of the state governing
buyer and/or the seller may apply, and so you
have to be mindful of that. You certainly have
that in this situation where you have got a
management buy-out with a CEO being on the
seller's side and on the buyer's side. There are
a number of questions that come up. One of
them is what fiduciary duties apply to the
directors of Parent and Target and whether they
agree not to provide information to any other
bidder or consider the merits of any competing
transaction.
Please look at Section 5.6, where I have served
up for Larry, what I consider a very simple,
straight forward, no negotiation provision (see
Appendix G). It says Parent will not discuss,
negotiate with, provide any non-public
information to or consider the merits of, any
inquiries or proposals from any person. I want
this deal adequately protected and, of course,
Larry, I want you to give me a Frank Balotti
opinion to the effect that this provision can be
enforced in accordance with its terms.
We are talking about deal protection.
Let us start with the basic obligation of the
seller. The seller is obligated to obtain the best
price available for the assets. That's normal sale
of asset law going back ten, twenty, thirty, forty
years. In fact, Revlon26 and those cases that deal
with the sale of the entire enterprise, started
from the law dealing with sale of assets. How-
ever, there are not any cases on deal protection
in sale of assets as far as I know in Delaware. It
seems as if our sale of asset law stopped
developing about the time the sale of the
26 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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enterprise law started to develop under Van
Gorkom,27 Revlon, and all those cases that you
know and love. But, to start with a basic
proposition: How is it that the seller knows that
it is obtaining the best price available when it
deals exclusively with one buyer? That is a
difficult question. Our facts do not mention the
presence of an investment banker who advised
the seller on price or anybody who advised the
seller on the fair market value of the asset. So,
you have some fiduciary problems because there
is no method by which the seller can have
assurance that the assets being sold are being
sold for the best price available. One can make
a pretty decent argument that if you buy Revlon
and QVC 8 as applying to a sale of assets, then
Parent's directors here have not fulfilled their
responsibility of insuring that they are obtaining
the best price reasonably available.
Suppose we have an investment banker. In that
case you would be able to give Byron the
opinion he wants?
Not necessarily. However, a stockholder vote
should do it in my mind if there is disclosure to
the shareholders that the board dealt exclusively
with one buyer, did not afford any other buyers
the opportunity to review these assets, and these
are the terms under which we ask you to
approve this transaction. That should be very
helpful. It may, in fact, extinguish arguments
under a Revlon analogy. That is not case law, but
I think that is the best side of the argument.
Frank, suppose that your client is in extremis.
We are talking about the age of insolvency
coming on, your client is not in very good shape
27 Smith v.Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2B Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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and you do not have time to go get a sanitizing
shareholder vote. You do not have time to go
out and do an extensive auction. My client is
here with cash and is willing to bail you out.
Now, can you take that into account?
I think you can take that into account, but I am
not sure you can take it into account in the
analysis I went through before on whether or
not a shareholder vote is required under Section
271 of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
because again, we do not have the case that says
you do not need to live up to that statutory
provision if the corporation is in extremis. I
think the buyer and the seller are going to be
concerned that once a proxy statement goes out,
a shareholder will come out of the woodwork,
file an action in court and try to enjoin the sale
on the grounds that the assets are not being sold
for the highest available price. You then get into
the question of whether the Revlon line of cases
applies in a situation like this or whether we are
talking about business judgment rule analysis,
which I think is the question that Larry was
asking.
In this particular transaction, we have the CEO
of Parent as a controlling shareholder of Buyer.
So, we have a situation where we have an
interested party on both sides of the transaction.
That is true.
Now, so even if we get a shareholder vote,
Frank, and the transaction is challenged, what is
the standard of review? Is it business judgment
rule, is it enhanced scrutiny under Unoca129 or is
it entire fairness?
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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It is probably entire fairness and with a
shareholder vote with appropriate disclosure,
you would shift the burden to the plaintiff to
show that the transaction is not entirely fair.
This should be contrasted with the normal
burden on the defendant to show that the
transaction is entirely fair.
Let me make sure I understood you. So you
think that entire fairness standard would apply
to Parent's board? And the question is whether
the burden is going to be on the board or the
burden is going to be on the plaintiff? And if
you have a fully informed shareholder vote,
perhaps following action by an independent
board or an independent committee of the
board, then you would have the burden shifted
to the plaintiff. Is that right?
That is one way to look at it. On the other
hand, assume that you have an interested
transaction where you have a board of directors
say often people and one of them is dealing with
the corporation and the other nine independent
directors review the transaction. In that
instance, entire fairness does not apply. Entire
fairness does not apply to every transaction. I
would have thought that a transaction of the
type that I just described would be one reviewed
under the business judgment rule. We do not
know in this case how many members of the
board in addition to the CEO are part of the
buying group. So, I think you need to look at
the make-up of the board and who is involved
before you reach a final decision on business
judgment or entire fairness.
Frank, I cannot imagine that, if there was a
question as to whether shareholder approval was
required because it was all or substantially all the
assets, a buyer would accept anything less than
shareholder approval. Extremis or whatever is
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no defense to not getting shareholders to
approve the transaction.
What buyers occasionally accept is the opinion
of counsel as to whether or not a shareholder
vote is required. It happens many times when
speed is of necessity and the deal has to close as
in Byron's example, and if the lawyer is of the
opinion that a shareholder vote is not required.
In such cases many buyers close based on that
opinion.
Yes, but under the hypothetical of more than
fifty percent of the assets and virtually all of the
operating income, I do not think your firm
would give me that opinion.
You probably would not get that opinion from a
reputable Delaware firm. You might get it from
Texas firm. Let me draw a distinction here
between the situation that we are talking about
in this case, and the fact pattern in a closely held
situation. If you have all the shareholders of the
target company agreeing to the transaction, then
these issues do not arise.
That is exactly what the assumptions are in the
Model Asset Purchase Agreement. The contract
is by and among a selling company and its major
shareholders, not all of them, but its major
shareholders that constitute well over what is
necessary to satisfy any shareholder vote
problem. So the issue disappears in such case.
Negotiation of Indemnification Provisions
Moving onward, assume that we have gotten
past the corporate hurdles and we are down to
negotiating the simple provisions relating to
indemnification. Turn to Article 11 (see
Appendix H). Section 11.2 basically says that
Seller is going to indemnify Buyer for any
2002]
198 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 10:145
LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
BYRON EGAN:
(Acquiror Counsel)
LARRY TAFE:
(Target Counsel)
liability arising out of the ownership or
operation of the assets prior to the effective time.
Larry, do you have any problem with that?
Well, I do not have any problem with that. Let
me talk just a little bit and go out of the
negotiating mode for a minute because I think it
works better. Byron and I cannot really fight
about the rules of successor liability. They are
what they are.
And that is what Section 11.2 is intended to deal
with.
One of the nice things about going through the
experience that we have had with this asset
acquisition agreement project over the last
several years is that you actually learn
something. The most significant bit of new
knowledge that I have acquired is the extent to
which various and sundry doctrines of successor
liability have eroded what I grew up thinking
was an inviolate principle: namely that in an
asset acquisition, unlike a stock or merger deal,
the contract would, in fact, control what
liabilities the buying party is stuck with. And if
you draft it carefully enough and you make very
clear that, as between buyer and seller, the buyer
is not assuming liabilities as Byron has suggested
in his review of the Section 2 provisions, it
works and, of course, is respected. We all know
that there have always been some sort of
traditional exceptions to that rule. Sam has
mentioned tax liens. There were statutes like
the bulk sales and fraudulent transfer statutes.
There have been exceptions for fraud issues.
But those are all well-known and recognized
exceptions that we all know and love and can
deal with. You can really deal with tax liens.
You can deal with, at least to some extent,
fraudulent conveyance issues if you can do
financial analysis and solvency analysis and that
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sort of thing. More recently we have had some
environmental statutes that have imposed strict
liability, and there is no way any contract can
override them. But all those things are there
and we deal with them and we know them.
What we have not had to deal with until recent
years is a number of doctrines that have been
adopted in one way or another by a number of
states that really do say that if the transaction
falls into this sort of category, the court will, in
fact, impose liability on a buyer for a seller's
liability, even though the contract says in bold,
clear, black and white terms that the parties
intended otherwise. Section IV of this article
surveys various and sundry theories of successor
liability. And there are some that are kind of far
out. California, as you might expect, has one
that is kind of far out and is a strict liability tort
doctrine. It is the same doctrine that says that if
the seller's gone, which is generally the case
(otherwise there is no reason to chase the
buyer), and a guy's leg is cut off, then the guy
can recover from the buyer. It is dressed up in
somewhat fancier language than that, but that is
really the bottom line.
By the way, that doctrine has not been accepted
in Florida.
Indeed the doctrine has been expressly
disavowed in probably twenty-five or thirty
states and has been accepted only in two or
three. What is by no means a far out doctrine, is
the de facto merger principle. And, you know,
the courts will begin by recognizing the con-
ventional rule and, then they will say, but, of
course, there is an exception if there's a de facto
merger. And there are four factors that can
bring about a de facto merger in the view of the
court. First, the enterprise continues with sub-
stantially the same form, the same management,
the same locale, the same product, the same
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facilities and so forth. Second, the seller goes
out of business, liquidates, dissolves, ceases its
operations, which would not be the case we are
posing here, but it would be under the facts on
which the Model Asset Acquisition Agreement
is based. Third, buyer assumes the ordinary
course liabilities of the selling enterprise. Those
three factors are not exactly extraordinary items
in a typical sale of all of the assets of an enter-
prise. The fourth factor is not quite as common,
and is whether the shareholders or a shareholder
of the seller wind up with some equity interest
in the buyer. And that goes back to the origins
of the de facto merger doctrine, which I believe
were in Pennsylvania 40 years ago which dealt
with some appraisal rights cases.
30
Larry, in Texas we got confused again with all
those theories and we simply amended our
statute, the Texas Business Corporation Act, to
provide that the doctrine of de facto merger is
dead, and we tried to drive a stake through its
heart and all of the progeny that Larry's been
talking about in asset deals.3 Now, the issue of
course is where does the claim arise and will it
arise in a state that is user friendly for those
doctrines and where the Texas statute is not
respected, and that is an issue for another day.
One quick comment about the successor
liability issue because there are some important
points that I think you need to keep in mind.
Larry talked about the de facto merger concept
as being the approach that has been taken by
Massachusetts and perhaps other states as the
doctrinal basis for successor liability. Byron
suggested that would not be the result in Texas
30 Farris v. Glen Alden, 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958).
31 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. Art. 5.10 (2001); see Byron F. Egan and Curtis W. Huff, Choice of State of
Incorporation - Texas versus Delaware: Is It Now Time to Rethink Traditional Notions?, 54 SMU Law Review
249,288-290 (Winter 2001).
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because Texas has abolished de facto mergers.
Well in Delaware, we have decisional laws that
declare that Delaware does not recognize de
facto mergers either. Thus, we would come out
in Delaware the same way that Texas comes out.
However, a few minutes in the library
convinced us otherwise because there are cases,
a district court case followed by state court
decisions that do adopt successor liability based
on the de facto merger doctrine. So what we
have is a peculiar situation in which for purposes
of corporate law, that is applying the Delaware
corporate statute, there is no such animal as de
facto merger, but for purposes of successor
liability there may be. And those of you who are
from states that proclaim not to follow a de facto
merger theory should be careful and research
that area carefully in the context of the successor
liability concept before you draw any untoward
conclusions.
We are coming to the end of our time, but we
would like to call your attention and Judge
Jacobs' attention to Section 11.11 in your
materials. It provides for indemnification in the
case of strict liability of the indemnitee or
indemnitee negligence. All this is in bold face,
and my friends from New York say that bold
face type looks funny. They have probably seen
it in some deals where they think it is
unnecessary. The provision basically says that
the indemnification provisions that are
elsewhere in the agreement are going to be
applicable irrespective of whether the liability
arises out of the negligence of the indemnitee or
arises out of a strict liability doctrine imposed on
the indemnitee. And there is a Fifth Circuit
case, Fina 2 that explains that a general
"indemnity provision [similar to Section 11.2,
32 Fina, Inc. v. ARCO, 200 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2000).
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see Appendix H] is not enforceable under Texas
law as applied to strict liability."33 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned: "Texas law requires that each
type of claim be separately referenced by an
indemnity provision: 'Indemnification against
strict liability is an exception to usual business
practices in the same manner as indemnifying
against someone else's negligence.... [F]airness
dictates against imposing liability on an
indemnitor unless the agreement clearly and
specifically expresses the intent to encompass
strict liability claims. ' " ' Now, we have the
Judge and I would like him to tell us whether
the Fifth Circuit got it right. Is the express
negligence doctrine something that you
recognize in Delaware?
It is recognized in Delaware. It is legally all right
to have an indemnification clause where an
indemnitiee can be indemnified against the
consequences of its own negligence provided
that is clearly and expressly stated in the
indemnification provision of the contract. If
that is what the Fifth Circuit held, then that is
consistent with our rule. Whether it is right or
not is not for me to say.
Judge, thank you very much for that very
important point. We have come to the end of
our program and I want to thank you all again
for coming. I also want to thank our speakers,
and I want to give a particular thanks to our co-
chairs Dennis and Harvey for their great service
on behalf of the University of Miami School of
Law.
33 Id. at 274.
3 Id.
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APPENDIX A. SECTION 2, ASSETS ACQUIRED AND
LIABILrTES ASSUMED
2. SALE AND TRANSFER OF ASSETS; CLOSING
2.1 ASSETS TO BE SOLD
Upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this
Agreement, at the Closing, but effective as of the Effective Time, Seller shall
sell, convey, assign, transfer and deliver to Buyer, free and clear of any
Encumbrances other than Permitted Encumbrances, and Buyer shall
purchase and acquire from Seller, all of Seller's right, title and interest in and
to all of Seller's property and assets, real, personal or mixed, tangible and
intangible, of every kind and description, wherever located, including the
following (but excluding the Excluded Assets):
(a) all Real Property, including the Real Property described in Parts 3.7
and 3.8;
(b) all Tangible Personal Property, including those items described in
Part 2.1(b);
(c) all Inventories;
(d) all Accounts Receivable;
(e) all Seller Contracts, including those listed in Part 3.20(a), and all
outstanding offers or solicitations made by or to Seller to enter into
any Contract;
(f all Governmental Authorizations and all pending applications
therefore or renewals thereof, in each case to the extent transferable
to Buyer, including those listed in Part 3.17(b);
(g) all data and Records related to the operations of Seller, including
client and customer lists and Records, referral sources, research and
development reports and Records, production reports and Records,
service and warranty Records, equipment logs, operating guides and
manuals, financial and accounting Records, creative materials,
advertising materials, promotional materials, studies, reports,
correspondence and other similar documents and Records and,
subject to Legal Requirements, copies of all personnel Records and
other Records described in Section 2 .2 (g);
(h) all of the intangible rights and property of Seller, including
Intellectual Property Assets, going concern value, good-will,
telephone, telecopy and e-mail addresses, websites and listings and
those items listed in Part 3.25(d), (e), (f) and (h);
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(i) all insurance benefits, including rights and proceeds, arising from or
relating to the Assets or the Assumed Liabilities prior to the Effective
Time, unless expended in accordance with this Agreement;
(j) all claims of Seller against third parties relating to the Assets,
whether choate or inchoate, known or unknown, contingent or
non-contingent, including all such claims listed in Part 2.16); and
(k) all rights of Seller relating to deposits and prepaid expenses, claims
for refunds and rights to offset in respect thereof which are not
listed in Part 2.2(d) and which are not excluded under Section
2.2(h).
All of the foregoing property and assets are herein referred to collectively as
the "Assets".
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the transfer of the Assets pursuant to this
Agreement shall not include the assumption of any Liability in respect
thereof unless the Buyer expressly assumes-such Liability pursuant to Section
2.4(a).
2.2 EXCLUDED ASSETS
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Section 2.1 or
elsewhere in this Agreement, the following assets of Seller (collectively, the
"Excluded Assets") are not part of the sale and purchase contemplated
hereunder, are excluded from the Assets, and shall remain the property of
Seller after the Closing:
(a) all cash, cash equivalents and short term investments;
(b) all minute books, stock Records and corporate seals;
(c) the shares of capital stock of Seller held in treasury;
(d) those rights relating to deposits and prepaid expenses and claims for
refunds and rights to offset in respect thereof listed in Part 2.2(d);
(e) all insurance policies and rights thereunder (except to the extent
specified in Section 2.1(i) and (j));
() all of the Seller Contracts listed in Part 2.2(0;
(g) all personnel Records and other Records that Seller is required by
law to retain in its possession;
(h) all claims for refund of Taxes and other governmental charges of
whatever nature;
(i) all rights in connection with and assets of the Employee Plans;
(j) all rights of Seller under this Agreement, the Bill of Sale, the
Assignment and Assumption Agreement, the Promissory Note and
the Escrow Agreement; and
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(k) property and assets expressly designated in Part 2.2(k).
2.3 CONSIDERATION
The consideration for the Assets (the "Purchase Price") will be (i)
$__ plus or minus the Adjustment Amount and (ii) the assumption
of the Assumed Liabilities. In accordance with Section 2.7(b), at the Closing
the Purchase Price, prior to adjustment on account of the Adjustment
Amount, shall be delivered by Buyer to Seller as follows: (i) $ by
wire transfer; (ii) $ _ payable in the form of the Promissory Note;
(iii) $ _ paid to the escrow agent pursuant to the Escrow Agreement;
and (iv) the balance of the Purchase Price by the execution and delivery of
the Assignment and Assumption Agreement. The Adjustment Amount shall
be paid in accordance with Section 2.8.
2.4 LiABIL1TIEs
(a) Assumed Liabilities. On the Closing Date, but effective as of the
Effective Time, Buyer shall assume and agree to discharge only the following
Liabilities of Seller (the "Assumed Liabilities"):
(i) any trade account payable reflected on the Interim Balance Sheet
(other than a trade account payable to any Shareholder or a Related
Person of Seller) which remain unpaid at and are not delinquent as
of the Effective Time;
(ii) any trade account payable (other than a trade account payable to
any Shareholder or a Related Person of Seller) that have been
incurred by Seller in the Ordinary Course of Business between the
date of the Interim Balance Sheet and the Closing Date which
remains unpaid at and are not delinquent is of the Effective Time;
(iii) any Liability to Seller's customers incurred by Seller in the
Ordinary Course of Business for non-delinquent orders outstanding
as of the Effective Time reflected on Seller's books (other than any
Liability arising out of or relating to a Breach which occurred prior
to the Effective Time);
(iv) any Liability to Seller's customers under written warranty
agreements in the forms disclosed in Part 2.4(a)(iv) given by Seller
to its customers in the Ordinary Course of Business prior to the
Effective Time (other than any Liability arising out of or relating to
a Breach which occurred prior to the Effective Time);
(v) any Liability arising after the Effective Time under the Seller
Contracts described in Part 3.20(a) (other than any Liability arising
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under the Seller Contracts described on Part 2.4(a)(v) or arising out
of or relating to a Breach which occurred prior to the Effective
Time);
(vi) any Liability of Seller arising after the Effective Time under any
Seller Contract included in the Assets which is entered into by Seller
after the date hereof in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement (other than any Liability arising out of or relating to a
Breach which occurred prior to the Effective Time); and
(vii) any Liability of Seller described on Part 2.4(a)(vii).
(b) Retained Liabilities. The Retained Liabilities shall remain the sole
responsibility of and shall be retained, paid, performed and discharged solely
by Seller. "Retained Liabilities" shall mean every Liability of Seller other
than the Assumed Liabilities, including:
(i) any Liability arising out of or relating to products of Seller to the
extent manufactured or sold prior to the Effective Time other than
to the extent assumed under Section 2.4(a)(iii), (iv) or (v);
(ii) any Liability under any Contract assumed by Buyer pursuant to
Section 2.4(a) which arises after the Effective Time but which arises
out of or relates to any Breach that occurred prior to the Effective
Time;
(iii) any Liability for Taxes, including (A) any Taxes arising as a
result of Seller's operation of its business or ownership of the Assets
prior to the Effective Time, (B) any Taxes that will arise as a result
of the sale of the Assets pursuant to this Agreement and (C) any
deferred Taxes of any nature;
(iv) any Liability under any Contract not assumed by Buyer under
Section 2.4(a), including any Liability arising out of or relating to
Seller's credit facilities or any security interest related thereto;
(v) any Environmental, Health and Safety Liabilities arising out of
or relating to the operation of Seller's business or Seller's leasing,
ownership or operation of real property;
(vi) any Liability under the Employee Plans or relating to payroll,
vacation, sick leave, worker's compensation, unemployment benefits,
pension benefits, employee stock option or profit-sharing plans,
health care plans or benefits, or any other employee plans or benefits
of any kind for Seller's employees or former employees, or both;
(vii) any Liability under any employment, severance, retention or
termination agreement with any employee of Seller or any of its
Related Persons;
ASSETACQUISITIONS
(viii) any Liability arising out of or relating to any employee
grievance whether or not the affected employees are hired by Buyer;
(ix) any Liability of Seller to any Shareholder or Related Person of
Seller or any Shareholder;
(x) any Liability to indemnify, reimburse or advance amounts to any
officer, director, employee or agent of Seller;
(xi) any Liability to distribute to any of Seller's shareholders or
otherwise apply all or any part of the consideration received
hereunder;
(xii) any Liability arising out of any Proceeding pending as of the
Effective Time, whether or not set forth in the Disclosure Letter;
(xiii) any Liability arising out of any Proceeding commenced after
the Effective Time and arising out of, or relating to, any occurrence
or event happening prior to the Effective Time;
(xiv) any Liability arising out of or resulting from Seller's non-
compliance with any Legal Requirement or Order of any
Governmental Body;
(xv) any Liability of Seller under this Agreement or any other
document executed in connection with the Contemplated
Transactions; and
(xvi) any Liability of Seller based upon Seller's acts or omissions
occurring after the Effective Time.
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APPENDIX B. SECTION 3.2, ENFORCEABILITY REPRESENTATION
3. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER AND
SHAREHOLDERS
Seller and each Shareholder represent and warrantjointly and severally,
to Buyer as follows:
3.2 ENFORCEABILITY; AUTHORITY; NO CONFLICT
(a) This Agreement constitutes the legal, valid, and binding
obligation of Seller and each Shareholder, enforceable against each
of them in accordance with its terms. Upon the execution and
delivery by Seller and Shareholders of the Escrow Agreement, the
Employment Agreement, the Noncompetition Agreement, and each
other agreement to be executed or delivered by any or all of Seller
and Shareholders at the Closing (collectively, the "Seller's Closing
Documents"), each of Seller's Closing Documents will constitute
the legal, valid, and binding obligation of each of Seller and the
Shareholders a party thereto, enforceable against each of them in
accordance with its terms. Seller has the absolute and unrestricted
right, power and authority to execute and deliver this Agreement and
the Seller's Closing Documents to which it is a party and to perform
its obligations under this Agreement and the Seller's Closing
Documents, and such action has been duly authorized by all
necessary action by Seller's shareholders and board of directors. Each
Shareholder has all necessary legal capacity to enter into this
Agreement and the Seller's Closing Documents to which such
Shareholder is a party and to perform his obligations hereunder and
thereunder.
(b) Except as set forth in Part 3.2(b), neither the execution and
delivery of this Agreement nor the consummation or performance
of any of the Contemplated Transactions will, directly or indirectly
(with or without notice or lapse of time):
(i) Breach (A) any provision of any of the Governing Docu-
ments of Seller, or (B) any resolution adopted by the board of
directors or the shareholders of Seller;
(ii) Breach or give any Governmental Body or other Person the
right to challenge any of the Contemplated Transactions or to
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exercise any remedy or obtain any relief under any Legal
Requirement or any Order to which Seller or either
Shareholder, or any of the Assets, may be subject;
(iii) contravene, conflict with, or result in a violation or breach
of any of the terms or requirements of, or give any
Governmental Body the right to revoke, withdraw, suspend,
cancel, terminate, or modify, any Governmental Authorization
that is held by Seller or that otherwise relates to the Assets or to
the business of Seller;
(iv) cause Buyer to become subject to, or to become liable for
the payment of, any Tax;
(v) Breach any provision of, or give any Person the right to
declare a default or exercise any remedy under, or to accelerate
the maturity or performance of, or payment under, or to cancel,
terminate, or modify, any Seller Contract;
(vi) result in the imposition or creation of any Encumbrance
upon or with respect to any of the Assets; or
(vii) result in any shareholder of the Seller having the right to
exercise dissenters' appraisal rights.
(c) Except as set forth in Part 3.2(c), neither Seller nor either
Shareholder is required to give any notice to or obtain any Consent
from any Person in connection with the execution and delivery of
this Agreement or the consummation or performance of any of the
Contemplated Transactions.
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APPENDIX C. SECTION 3.6, SUFFICIENCY OF ASSETS
REPRESENTATION
3.6 SUFFICIENCY OF ASSETS
Except as disclosed in Part 3.6, the Assets (a) constitute all of the assets,
tangible and intangible, of any nature whatsoever, necessary to operate
Seller's business in the manner presently operated by Seller and (b) include
all of the operating assets of Seller.
APPENDIX D. SECTION 3.13, No UNDISCLOSED LIABILITIEs
REPRESENTATION
3.13 No UNDISCLOSED LiBILrrms
Except as set forth in Part 3.13, Seller has no Liability except for
Liabilities reflected or reserved against in the Balance Sheet or the Interim
Balance Sheet and current liabilities incurred in the Ordinary Course of
Business of Seller since the date of the Interim Balance Sheet.
ASSETACQUISITIONS
APPENDIX E. SECTION 3.14, TAXES REPRESENTATION
3.14 TAxEs
(a) Tax Returns Filed and Taxes Paid. Seller has filed or caused to be
filed on a timely basis all Tax Returns and all reports with respect to
Taxes that are or were required to be filed pursuant to applicable
Legal Requirements. All Tax Returns and reports filed by Seller are
true, correct and complete. Seller has paid, or made provision for the
payment of, all Taxes that have or may have become due for all
periods covered by the Tax Returns or otherwise, or pursuant to any
assessment received by Seller, except such Taxes, if any, as are listed
in Part 3.14(a) and are being contested in good faith and as to which
adequate reserves (determined in accordance with GAAP) have been
provided in the Balance Sheet and the Interim Balance Sheet. Except
as provided in Part 3.14(a), Seller currently is not the beneficiary of
any extension of time within which to file any Tax Return. No claim
has ever been made or is expected to be made by any Governmental
Body in ajurisdiction where Seller does not file Tax Returns that it
is or may be subject to taxation by that jurisdiction. There are no
Encumbrances on any of the Assets that arose in connection with
any failure (or alleged failure) to pay any Tax, and Seller has no
Knowledge of any basis for assertion of any claims attributable to
Taxes which, if adversely determined, would result in any such
Encumbrance.
(b) Delivery of Tax Returns and Infornation RegardingAudits and Potential
Audits. Seller has delivered or made available to Buyer copies of, and
Part 3.14(b) contains a complete and accurate list of, all Tax Returns
filed since _,20__. The federal and state income or franchise
Tax Returns of Seller have been audited by the IRS or relevant state
tax authorities or are closed by the applicable statute of limitations
for all taxable years through _ , 20__. Part 3.14(b) contains a
complete and accurate list of all Tax Returns that have been audited
or are currently under audit and accurately describe any deficiencies
or other amounts that were paid or are currently being contested.
To the Knowledge of Seller, no undisclosed deficiencies are expected
to be asserted with respect to any such audit. All deficiencies
proposed as a result of such audits have been paid, reserved against,
settled, or are being contested in good faith by appropriate
proceedings as described in Part 3.14(b). Seller has delivered, or
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made available to Buyer, copies of any examination reports,
statements or deficiencies, or similar items with respect to such
audits. Except as provided in Part 3.14(b), Seller has no knowledge
that any Governmental Body is likely to assess any additional taxes
for any period for which Tax Returns have been filed. There is no
dispute or claim concerning any Taxes of Seller either (i) claimed or
raised by any Governmental Body in writing or (ii) as to which Seller
has Knowledge. Part 3.14(b) contains a list of all Tax Returns for
which the applicable statute of limitations has not run. Except as
described in Part 3.14(b), Seller has not given or been requested to
give waivers or extensions (or is or would be subject to a waiver or
extension given by any other Person) of any statute of limitations
relating to the payment of Taxes of Seller or for which Seller may be
liable.
(c) ProperAccrual. The charges, accruals, and reserves with respect to
Taxes on the Records of Seller are adequate (determined in
accordance with GAAP) and are at least equal to Seller's liability for
Taxes. There exists no proposed tax assessment or deficiency against
Seller except as disclosed in the [Interim] Balance Sheet or in Part
3.14(c).
(d) Specific Potential Tax Liabilities and Tax Situations.
(i) Withholding. All taxes that Seller is or was required by
Legal Requirements to withhold, deduct or collect have
been duly withheld, deducted and collected and, to the
extent required, have been paid to the proper Governmental
Body or other Person.
(ii) Tax Sharing or SimilarAgreements. There is no tax sharing
agreement, tax allocation agreement, tax indemnity
obligation or similar written or unwritten agreement,
arrangement, understanding or practice with respect to
Taxes (including any advance pricing agreement, closing
agreement or other arrangement relating to Taxes) that will
require any payment by Seller.
(iii) Consolidated Group. Seller (A) has not been a member
of an affiliated group within the meaning of Code Section
1504(a) (or any similar group defined under a similar
provision of state, local or foreign law), and (B) has no
liability for Taxes of any person (other than Seller and its
Subsidiaries) under Reg. Section 1.1502-6 (or any similar
provision of state, local or foreign law), as a transferee or
successor by contract or otherwise.
ASSETACQUISITIONS
(iv) S Corporation. Seller is not an S corporation as defined
in Code Section 1361.
ALTERNATIVE No. 1:
Seller is an S corporation as defined in Code Section 1361 and Seller
is not and has not been subject to either the built-in-gains tax under
Code Section 1374 or the passive income tax under Code Section
1375.
ALTERNATIVE No. 2:
Seller is an S corporation as defined in Code Section 1361 and Seller
is not subject to the tax on passive income under Code Section 1375,
but is subject to the built-in-gains tax under Code Section 1374, and
all tax liabilities under Code Section 1374 though and including the
Closing Date have on shall be properly paid and discharged by Seller.
INCLUDE WITH BOTH ALTERNATIVE No. 1 AND No. 2:
Part 3.14(d) (iv) lists all the states and localities with respect to which
Seller is required to file any corporate, income or franchise tax
returns and sets forth whether Seller is treated as the equivalent of
an S corporation by or with respect to each such state or locality.
Seller has properly filed Tax Returns with and paid and discharged
any liabilities for taxes in any states or localities in which it is subject
to Tax.
(v) Substantial Understatement Penalty. Seller has disclosed on its
federal income Tax Returns all positions taken therein that could
give rise to a substantial understatement of federal income Tax
within the meaning of Code Section 6662.
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APPENDIX F. SECTION 3.33, 1OB-5 REPRESENTATION
3.33 DISCLOSURE
(a) No representation or warranty or other statement made by Seller
or either Shareholder in this Agreement, the Disclosure Letter, any
supplement to the Disclosure Letter, the certificates delivered
pursuant to Section 2.7(b) or otherwise in connection with the
Contemplated Transactions contains any untrue statement or omits
to state a material fact necessary to make any of them, in light of the
circumstances in which it was made, not misleading.
(b) Seller does not have Knowledge of any fact that has specific
application to Seller (other than general economic or industry
conditions) and that may materially adversely affect the assets,
business, prospects, financial condition, or results of operations of
Seller that has not been set forth in this Agreement or the Disclosure
Letter.
APPENDIX G. SECTION 5.6, No NEGOTIATION COVENANT
5.6 No NEGOTIATION
Until such time as this Agreement shall be terminated pursuant to
Section 9.1, neither Seller nor either Shareholder shall directly or indirectly
solicit, initiate, encourage or entertain any inquiries or proposals from,
discuss or negotiate with, provide any non-public information to, or consider
the merits of any inquiries or proposals from, any Person (other than Buyer)
relating to any business combination transaction involving Seller, including
the sale by the Shareholders of Seller's stock, the merger or consolidation of
Seller, or the sale of Seller's business or any of the Assets (other than in the
Ordinary Course of Business). Seller and Shareholders shall notify Buyer
of any such inquiry or proposal within twenty four hours of receipt or
awareness of the same by Seller or either Shareholder.
ASSETACQUISITIONS
APPENDIX H. SECTION 11.1, GENERAL INDEMNIFICATION
PROVISION
11. INDEMNIFICATION; REMEDIES
11.1 SURVIVAL
All representations, warranties, covenants, and obligations in this
Agreement, the Disclosure Letter, the supplements to the Disclosure Letter,
the certificates delivered pursuant to Section 2.7, and any other certificate or
document delivered pursuant to this Agreement shall survive the Closing
and the consummation ofthe Contemplated Transactions, subject to Section
11.7. The right to indemnification, reimbursement, or other remedy based
on such representations, warranties, covenants and obligations shall not be
affected by any investigation (including any environmental investigation or
assessment) conducted with respect to, or any Knowledge acquired (or
capable of being acquired) at any time, whether before or after the execution
and delivery of this Agreement or the Closing Date, with respect to the
accuracy or inaccuracy of or compliance with, any such representation,
warranty, covenant or obligation. The waiver of any condition based on the
accuracy of any representation or warranty, or on the performance of or
compliance with any covenant or obligation, will not affect the right to
indemnification, reimbursement, or other remedy based on such
representations, warranties, covenants and obligations.
11.2 INDEMNIFICATION AND REIMBURSEMENT BY SELLER AND
SHAREHOLDERS
Seller and each Shareholder, jointly and severally, will indemnify and
hold harmless Buyer, and its Representatives, shareholders, subsidiaries, and
Related Persons (collectively, the "Buyer Indemnified Persons"), and will
reimburse the Indemnified Persons, for any loss, liability, claim, damage,
expense (including costs of investigation and defense and reasonable
attorneys' fees and expenses) or diminution of value, whether or not
involving a Third-Party Claim (collectively, "Damages"), arising from or in
connection with:
(a) any Breach of any representation or warranty made by Seller or
either Shareholder in (i) this Agreement (without giving effect to any
supplement to the Disclosure Letter), (ii) the Disclosure Letter, (iii)
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the supplements to the Disclosure Letter, (iv) the certificates
delivered pursuant to Section 2.7 (for this purpose, each such
certificate will be deemed to have stated that Seller's and
Shareholders' representations and warranties in this Agreement
fulfill the requirements of Section 7.1 as of the Closing Date as if
made on the Closing Date without giving effect to any supplement
to the Disclosure Letter, unless the certificate expressly states that the
matters disclosed in a supplement have caused a condition specified
in Section 7.1 not to be satisfied), (v) any transfer instrument or (vi)
any other certificate, document, writing or instrument delivered by
Seller or either Shareholder pursuant to this Agreement;
(b) any Breach of any covenant or obligation of Seller or either
Shareholder in this Agreement or in any other certificate, document,
writing or instrument delivered by Seller or either Shareholder
pursuant to this Agreement;
(c) any Liability arising out of the ownership or operation of the
Assets prior to the Effective Time other than the Assumed
Liabilities;
(d) any brokerage or finder's fees or commissions or similar
payments based upon any agreement or understanding made, or
alleged to have been made, by any Person with Seller or either
Shareholder (or any Person acting on their behalf) in connection
with any of the Contemplated Transactions;
(e) any product or component thereof manufactured by or shipped,
or any services provided by, Seller, in whole or in part, prior to the
Closing Date;
(f) any matter disclosed in Parts _ of the Disclosure Letter;
(g) any noncompliance with any Bulk Sales Laws or fraudulent
transfer law in respect of the Contemplated Transactions;
(h) any liability under the WARN Act or any similar state or local
Legal Requirement that may result from an "Employment Loss," as
defined by 29 U.S.C. Section 2101(a)(6), caused by any action of
Seller prior to the Closing or by Buyer's decision not to hire
previous employees of Seller;
(i) any Employee Plan established or maintained by Seller; or
(j) any Retained Liabilities.
ASSETACQUISITIONS
11.11 INDEMNIFICATION IN CASE OF STRICT LIABILITY OR
INDEMNITEE NEGLIGENCE
THE INDEMNIFICATION PROVISIONS IN THIS ARTICLE
11 SHALL BE ENFORCEABLE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
THE LIABILITY IS BASED ON PAST, PRESENT OR FUTURE
ACTS, CLAIMS OR LEGAL REQUIREMENTS (INCLUDING
ANY PAST, PRESENT OR FUTURE BULK SALES LAW,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW, OR
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, SECURITIES OR OTHER LEGAL
REQUIREMENT), AND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ANY
PERSON (INCLUDING THE PERSON FROM WHOM
INDEMNIFICATION IS SOUGHT) ALLEGES OR PROVES THE
SOLE, CONCURRENT, CONTRIBUTORY OR COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE PERSON SEEKING
INDEMNIFICATION, OR THE SOLE OR CONCURRENT
STRICT LIABILITY IMPOSED ON THE PERSON SEEKING
INDEMNIFICATION.
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